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COMMENTS
EVIDENCE HANDED TO THE IRS
CRIMINAL DIVISION ON A "CIVIL"
PLATTER: CONSTITUTIONAL
EFRINGEMENTS ON TAXPAYERS
AMANDA A. COCHRAN, CPA
INTRODUCTION
Fear of being audited by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) pervades the lives of American taxpayers.' Taxpayers anx-
iously fear that the IRS may discover some evidence of taxpayer
mis-reporting, and seek retribution. But while the threat of a
hefty monetary penalty in conjunction with a routine civil tax
audit may devastate a tax-avoiding citizen, the peril of criminal
2punishment imposes draconian consequences by comparison.
Accordingly, taxpayers, if audited, may justifiably fear that the
true purpose of an IRS investigation is to garner evidence to
support a criminal prosecution. Often, this fear is realized.! Al-
J.D. candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2002. The author is also
a certified public accountant.
' BORns KOS LANm & Louis BE DER, CRBmi'AL AsPEcTs OF TAX FRAUD CASES 59
(3d ed. 1980).2 d.
3 See United States v. Serlin, 707 F.2d 953, 957 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The typical deceit
case involves a taxpayer who claims that his volubility was induced by assurances that
the investigation was 'routine' and only civil rather than criminal."); see also United
States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 1999) (taxpayer asserted that the IRS failed to
adhere to its own rules when it conducted a criminal investigation under the guise of
a civil audit); United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1998) (taxpayer
claimed that the IRS obtained evidence in violation of her constitutional rights by
telling her that they were conducting a routine civil tax audit when in fact they were
carrying out a covert criminal tax investigation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999);
United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977) (suppressing evidence obtained
in violation of taxpayer's constitutional rights when the IRS agent deceived taxpayer
699
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though an IRS examination may commence as a civil audit, IRS
agents frequently use information garnered during a civil inves-
tigation to instigate criminal proceedings against unsuspecting
citizens.
The IRS divides the responsibility of enforcing the nation's
tax laws between its civil and criminal divisions.5 During a typi-
cal civil tax investigation, an IRS agent's primary responsibility is
to determine the correctness of a tax return as filed.6 In com-
parison, the IRS agent's main objective during a criminal tax in-
vestigation is to determine whether the taxpayer has engaged in
fraudulent tax reporting.7 Interestingly, the most frequent cata-
lyst of a criminal investigation is the civil audit itself.8 However,
the juncture where a civil examination turns criminal is not al-
ways clear.9
Because the American legal system invokes strict constitu-
tional safeguards to protect individuals subject to criminal inves-
tigations,' ° it is critical that IRS regulations prohibit civil agents
from circumventing these safeguards by using the civil audit to
garner evidence for a criminal prosecution. The situation that
most taxpayers fear is that they will permit an IRS agent to ex-
amine their private books and records during the course of a
routine audit, and the agent will subsequently use this informa-
tion for criminal prosecution. Accordingly, the IRS has explic-
itly enacted regulations that prohibit an IRS agent from
into providing evidence for criminal conviction during a civil audit); Craig D. Bud-
ner, Note, The Exclusionary Rule's Application in Tax Proceedings: Reconciling the Rule's
Purpose for Tax Defendants, 68 TEX. L. REv. 789, 801 (March 1990) ("The [IRS's] im-
plied veto power enables the IRS agent to commit 'abusive and arbitrary acts' at the
expense of the taxpayer's constitutional liberties." (citing DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW
UNTO ITSELF: POwER, POLITICS AND THE IRS 64-66 (1989)).
4 See, e.g., McKee 192 F.3d at 544 (admitting that civil revenue agents sometimes
perform the same function as their criminal division counterparts, and this evidence
is often admissible at criminal trial); BURNHAM, supra note 3, at 46-47 (noting that
"revenue agents sometimes use their special status as investigators of civil cases to
camouflage the gathering of evidence for the far more serious business of pursuing
indictment on criminal charges").
Peters, 153 F.3d at 447.6
rd.
' 1 IAN M. COMIsKEYETAL., TAX FRAUD AND EVASION 1 4.03, 4.04 (6th ed. 1995).
8 MICHAEL L. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 4.02[l][a), 12.03[1]
(1981).
9 McKee, 192 F.3d at 535 (conceding that the "substantive distinction between an
IRS civil audit and a criminal tax investigation is not always clear").
" These include the right to remain silent, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and the right to
obtain representation from counsel, U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
700 [Vol. 91
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developing a criminal case against a taxpayer under the guise of
a civil investigation." If the agent uncovers evidence of criminal
wrongdoing during the course of a civil audit, the agent must
then refer the case to the criminal division for prosecution.2
Nonetheless, the stark reality is that revenue agents often gather
the same evidence as their criminal division counterparts and
effectively offer this evidence to the criminal division on a silver
platter. 3
These transgressions severely threaten the American volun-
tary tax reporting system. 4 The present revenue collection sys-
tem centers on the self-reporting and voluntary compliance of
taxpayers. 5 However, if taxpayers are uncertain as to whether
tax investigations are criminal or civil in nature, they will not
submit to routine tax examinations and the system of voluntary
compliance will collapse. 16  While the IRS properly requests
permission to examine books and records of taxpayers to collect
tax revenue, use of such information to secure evidence for
criminal prosecution poses a danger to the entire system. 7
What is worse, taxpayers frequently have little recourse
against agent misconduct based on the current state of the law.'
Legislation fails to specify a remedy for violations of taxpayers'
constitutional rights, 9 although these infringements clearly vio-
late IRS regulations. Furthermore, judicial action insufficiently
redresses these wrongs. Courts defer tremendous judgment to
nInternal Revenue Manual thereinafter IRM] §§ 4565.21 (1999).
. IRLM § 4565.21 (1999); see discussion infra Section I.C.
"McKee, 192 F.3d at 544.
" United States v. Flora, 362 U.S. 145 (1958) (noting that the American "system of
taxation is based on voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distrait"); CO.MSKEy
ET AL., supra note 7, 1.03 n.74 (recognizing that "voluntary compliance" has long
been a favorite slogan of generations of politicians and IRS officials, and is the basis
of our tax system); KOSrELANETZ, supra note 1, at 72.
SGOsKEYET AL, supra note 7, 1 1.03; KOSTELANZ, supra note 1, at 72.
16 COMISKcyEETA,, supra note 7, 1 1.03;
" See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 761 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting concern about the IRS's failure to detect or disapprove of violations of its
own internal rules).
" See Budner, supra note 3, at 790 (Taxpayer Bill of Rights "fails to specify any rem-
edy for violations of taxpayers' constitutional rights" (citing PRF.,mcE HAL.
INFOnIATION SERVICES, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE TECHNICAL AND MIScMu-ANEOUS
REVENEACF OF 1988, 901 at 233 (1988))).
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the individual IRS agents, and generally do not enforce vulner-
able taxpayers' rights against the IRS.
20
This Comment proposes that when the IRS fails to conduct
a criminal investigation in accordance with its own internal
regulations, the IRS violates a taxpayer's constitutional rights.
This Comment has five parts. Section I discusses the silent tran-
sition of an IRS civil audit to a criminal investigation, and the
regulations set forth in the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) that
forbid the IRS from conducting a criminal investigation under
the guise of a civil audit. Section II argues that the IRM confers
legal rights on taxpayers, at the very least, where such provisions
safeguard a taxpayer's constitutional rights. Section III argues
that the IRM provision that forbids an IRS agent from conduct-
ing a criminal investigation under the guise of a civil audit safe-
guards a taxpayer's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, and
thus confers substantive rights on a taxpayer such that the tax-
payer can challenge violations of the Manual. Section IV con-
tends that regardless of IRS regulations, taxpayers bear a heavy
burden in demonstrating that the IRS has violated its Manual
because the tests employed by the courts favor the IRS. Finally,
Section V concludes that the attention of Congress and the Su-
preme Court is imperative to declare that IRS regulations have
the effect of law, and to provide for a clearer indication of when
the IRS violates its own rules. Furthermore, attention of the IRS
is necessary to enforce adherence to its own regulations.
I. DUAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DMSIONS OF THE IRS
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)" l divides the responsi-
bility for enforcing the nation's tax laws between two investiga-
20 See United States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d 495, 498-99 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that
courts must give considerable weight to the IRS' interpretation of their own regula-
tions); United States v. Caldwell, 820 F.2d 1395, 1402 (4th Cir. 1987); Groder v.
United States, 816 F.2d 139, 143-144 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that second-guessing a
revenue agent'sjudgment should not become a routine chore for judges because the
administration of the revenue laws is a function which, by congressional directive and
by expertise, belongs to the IRS (quoting United States v. Matis, 476 F. Supp. 1287,
1292-93 (S.D.N.Y.))); Liberty Financial Services v. United States, 778 F.2d 1390, 1392
(9th Cir. 1985) (stating that courts hesitate second-guessing a revenue agent's judg-
ment); see also United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 544 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Given the
deference that IRS agents must be afforded to carry out their official duties, we can-
not say that [the agent] abused her discretion in continuing the investigation ....").
2 The Department of Treasury administers and enforces IRS law. SALTZMAN, supra
note 8, 1.02[1] (1981). The IRS is one of the eleven bureaus of the Department of
Treasury. Id
[Vol. 91
2001] CIViL TAX INQUIRLES AND CRIM1NAL EVIDENCE 703
tive divisions: the civil Examination Division and the Criminal
Investigation Division (CID).22 This section provides an overview
of these two divisions, describes the processes by which the IRS
conducts investigations of taxpayers, and concludes by describ-
ing the interaction between these two divisions and the typical
scenario where a civil audit evolves into a criminal investigation.
A. DUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE EXAMINATION DIVISION AND THE
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION (CID)
The Examination Division and the CID represent two dis-
tinct vehicles for an IRS investigation of a taxpayer.] The Ex-
amination Division is the civil arm of the government's tax
collecting scheme that is responsible for conducting routine
civil tax audits.24 An Examination Division investigator, known
as a "revenue agent," is assigned a tax return to investigate
2 United States v. Peters, 153 F.Sd 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1070 (1999). The IRS is partially organized by "specialized function." S.LtMAN, su-
pra note 8, 1.02 [2]. Personnel organized by specialized function perform one of two
types of roles: operations/compliance functions and support functions. Id. Opera-
tions/compliance functions include: assessment and collection of taxes, determina-
tion of the amount of taxes due, investigation of tax fraud, and hearing and deciding
taxpayer appeals. Id. Comparatively, support functions include technical advisory
services, internal auditing and security, personnel management, employee training,
facilities operation, fiscal management, planning and research, and public informa-
tion. Id. Note that the Collection Division is the operation/compliance function re-
sponsible for collecting rather than enforcing.
Peters, 153 F.3d at 447. The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) was previously
known as the Intelligence Division (ID). COMISKEYET -AL, supra note 7, 1.01[5].
Peters, 153 F.3d at 477. The Examination Division is responsible for closing the
nation's tax gap, which is the difference between income taxes owed and voluntarily
paid. The tax gap has increased dramatically despite the fact that Congress has en-
acted legislation since the early 1980s specifically designed to reduce it. CoMWSI' ET
Ai-, supra note 7, 1.03. "The IRS estimates that in recent years a bit more than 85%
of the taxes owed by American taxpayers were actually paid--83% voluntarily and
3.5% as a result of a range of IRS actions designed to improve compliance with the
law." The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse [hereinafter TRAC], IRS at
Work. The IRS and Its Responsibilities, available at
http://wvwv.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/aboutIRS/irsResponsibilities.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2001) (TRAC, located at Syracuse University (N.Y.), is a not-for-profit
data gathering, research, and distribution organization that provides comprehensive
information about the operation of various federal enforcement and regulatory
agencies. http://www.trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgencral.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2001)). "While the tax gap cannot be closed entirely, it is clear that a substantial por-
tion of the tax gap is attributable to individual and corporate nonfilers and evaders
from whom unpaid taxes can and should be collected." CoMISKEY ET At, supra note 7,
1.03.
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whether the taxpayer has reported the correct income and tax."'
The revenue agent performs numerical calculations, undertakes
complex matching programs, and, if necessary, selects the tax-
payer for a face-to-face audit."' In the last scenario, the revenue
agent conducts a field examination to determine the correct tax
and penalties, and claims for refund or credit.
2 7
A revenue agent begins a typical field examination by tele-
phoning the taxpayer, and informing the taxpayer that he or
she is under internal investigation. 8 The revenue agent enjoys
the broad authority to compel production of information that
may be relevant or material to the examination of a return.2 If
the taxpayer fails or refuses to furnish the agent with the infor-
mation requested, the agent may serve a summons to the tax-
payer, ordering the taxpayer or the taxpayer's record keeper to
'SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 8.06. The IRS uses sophisticated computer technology
and the accumulated experience of its personnel in the classification and selection of
returns for examination. Id. 8.01. Returns are classified as having audit potential
by computer analysis which numerically scores tax returns according to a mathemati-
cally determined probability of error. Returns with the highest scores--that is, the
highest probability of error-are then reviewed manually by experienced agents to
confirm audit potential before selection for examination. Id. Other circumstanccs
also lead to the selection of a return for examination. Returns with adjusted gross in-
comes above certain levels and those with respect to which refund or credit claims
have been filed are reviewed, and those with audit potential are selected for examina-
tion. Id.
2 SALrzMAN, supra note 8, at 8.01. After the initial selection, returns are exam-
ined via correspondence, office interviews or field examinations. Id. Returns se-
lected for field examination by revenue agents present intricate issues requiring more
advanced accounting skills and knowledge of the internal revenue laws than auditors
performing office examinations must exhibit. Id. 1 8.06; see also TRAC, IRS at Work:
The IRS and Its Responsibilities, available at
http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/aboutIRS/irsResponsibilities.htll (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2001) (noting that typically only a relatively small number of taxpayers
are examined via field examination).
' SALTMAN, supra note 8, 8.02[2]. Revenue agents also conduct field examina-
tions of offers in compromise-based on either doubt as to liability or inability to
pay-and even play the role of special field agents when requested, conducting joint
examinations with special agents of the CD where tax evasion may exist. Id.
Id. 8.06[1] [d]. Although the revenue agent must inform the taxpayer, not his
representative, the IRS expects that frequently the agent will be referred to the tax-
payer's accountant or attorney to set a date. Id The revenue agent will telephone
the taxpayer's representative for an appointment, but may make an unannounced
visit with the approval of his group manager. Id. When making the appointment for
the examination, the agent is advised to tell the taxpayer or the representative what
books and records should be made available. Id.
I.R.C. § 7602 (2001); SALrzMAN, supra note 8, 7 8.06[3] [b].
704 (Vol. 91
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produce the requested information.30 The revenue agent then
examines the taxpayer's records, customarily on the taxpayer's
premises,3' and determines if the taxpayer has paid the correct
income tax. 2 Revenue agents do not carry firearms, nor are
they required to provide taxpayers with a Miranda-like warning.3
If the revenue agent discovers discrepancies as a result of vari-
ous examination procedures, the agent dispatches a notice,3s
which includes the tax amount assessed and usually a civil pen-
alty including interest-ss
Although an Examination Division audit typically concludes
with a civil pecuniary settlement between the IRS and the tax-
payer,"' the audit may unearth evidence that causes the revenue
agent to refer the case to its criminal division counterpart for
investigation. 7 Specifically, if a revenue agent uncovers a "firm
indication of fraud" during the civil audit-that is, if the reve-
nue agent suspects that the taxpayer knowingly violated the tax
lawsd-the agent must immediately suspend the civil audit and
"SALTZmAN, supra note 8, 1 8.06[3] [b]. Although requests for production are
typically complied with without resort to a summons, the IRS has broad authority to
require production of records. Id. The matter may end up before a federal district
court, which ultimately decides whether or not to order production. Id.
.31 Id 8.0611] [d]; see also LR.C. § 7625(a) (2001).
32 See SALZMAN, supra note 8, 1 8.06 ("All examinations require a revenue agent:
(1) to identify items that indicate adjustment may be proper, (2) to verify items on
the return by gathering appropriate evidence, and (3) to apply the provisions of the
Code, as interpreted.").
"United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1070 (1999); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (explaining that warn-
ings of taxpayers' constitutional rights are required only when a suspect is subjected
to custodial interrogation).
4 TRAC, IRS at Work. The IRS and Its Responsibilities, available at
http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/aboutRS/irsResponsibilities.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2001).
._Id.
"S r .AN, supra note 8, 8.01. At the conclusion of the examination, the exam-
iner may accept the return as filed or assert a deficiency. Id. When a deficiency has
been asserted, the taxpayer has the option of agreeing or disagreeing with the exam-
iner's findings. Id. But, if the taxpayer agrees with the findings, a form is completed
setting forth the adjustments and the taxpayer's agreement to the immediate assess-
ment of the resulting deficiency. Id. If the taxpayer does not agree with the exam-
iner's adjustments, the examiner will prepare a report which is subject to review, and
the taxpayer may eventually obtain judicial review of the assessment. Id.
37 Peters, 153 F.3d at 447 (revenue agents are told that audit techniques are de-
signed to disclose not only errors in accounting and application of the tax laws, but
also irregularities indicating the possibilities of fraud).
3Id. at 447 ("[Ilt is the taxpayer's intent to evade taxes that distinguishes a crimi-
nal violation from a civil case."); see United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 543 (6th
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refer the case to the CID via a fraud referral report." IRS
criminal referrals may be brought under specific tax violations
such as the knowing failure to file a return or the knowing filing
of a fraudulent return,4 0 and increasingly involve money laun-
dering schemes, and drug or currency violations. The CID
then accepts the case and concentrates on possible criminal
prosecution.2
The CID is primarily responsible for the investigation of al-
leged criminal violations under the Internal Revenue Code, and
related federal statutes, including Title 18 of the United States
Code.3 Criminal tax investigations serve two purposes: to ensure
public confidence by enforcing criminal tax statutes and to fos-
ter voluntary compliance." Administratively, the IRS "uses the
Cir. 1999) ("Intent to evade tax occurs when a taxpayer knows that the misrepresenta-
tion is false. Intent is a mental process; a state of mind."); SALTZMAN, supra note 8,
7A.02[3] (stating that a taxpayer's willfulness to evade distinguishes a criminal pro-
ceeding from a civil proceeding).
39 IRM § 4565.21 (1999). If the revenue agent uncovers a "firm indication of fraud
on the part of the taxpayer," he or she must suspend the audit for referral to the CID
for investigation. The revenue agent then prepares a fraud referral report, and pres-
ents it to the CID. SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 8.06(7]. A Form 2797 indicates what the
revenue agent is supposed to look for in making the referral:
This report includes information that, in the agent's opinion, will enable the CID to evalu-
ate the criminal potential of the case and determine whether or not a joint investigation
shall be initiated. In general, the agent will identify the fraudulent transaction and make a
narrative outline of the facts to show that (1) there has been a substantial understatement
of income and (2) the taxpayer cannot explain the understatement or the explanation is
not plausible.
Id. Note that upon receipt of a referral, the CID screens the referral for case poten-
tial. COMISKEYETAL., supra note 7, 11 4.02[1] [a], 4.03[6]. If the case is accepted by
the CID, the referring revenue agent may continue to work on the case under the di-
rection of the assigned CID special agent. Id. This is termed a 'joint investigation."
Id. Typically, here, the revenue agent would stay on to review the taxpayer's books
and records, determine accounting entries, and perform other functions generally
related to the examination features of the investigation. Id.
40 TRAC, IRS at Work: The IRS and Its Responsibilities, available at
http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/aboutIRS/irsResponsibilitics.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2001).
41 Id.
42 Id.; SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 12.03[1] [a].
" CoMISKEYET AL., supra note 7, 1 4.03, 4.04. The extent to which the IRS crimi-
nal enforcement program plays a significant role in the reduction of the tax gap re-
mains unclear. Id. Undoubtedly, the CID can affect the tax gap because its general
enforcement program deals with legal source income. Unfortunately, however, the
IRS does not possess data on how the CID's general enforcement program affects the
tax gap. Id.
" Id. 1 1.03; see also Walter T. Henderson,Jr., Comment, Criminal Liability Under the
Internal Revenue Code: A Proposal to Make the "Voluntaiy" Compliance System a Little Less
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threat of criminal sanctions, fines, and imprisonment to deter
noncompliance with the tax laws."'
The CID receives information about potential tax evaders
from many sources inside and outside the IRS." For example,
cases may originate from information received by a civilian in-
formant, 7 a federal or state non-tax law enforcement agency, or
a foreign country cooperating with law enforcement authori-
ties .4  Cases may also originate from information-gathering and
other projects begun by special agents at the regional or district
level. Undoubtedly, however, the most important source for
criminal prosecution is referral from other IRS divisions. "' In
many cases, a routine civil audit of a taxpayer's return, per-
formed by the Examination Division, is the catalyst of a criminal
investigation.'
B. INTERNAL PROCESS OF THE CID
In the usual non-tax criminal case, the government has
knowledge of the alleged crime, and seeks to identify the perpe-
"Voluntay," 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1429, 1434-37 (1992) (indicating studies that suggest
that the possibility of criminal sanctions serves as a strong incentive for tax compli-
ance among members of the general population).
SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 1 12.01.
COMISKEYETAL, supra note 7, 4.02[1].
47 Id. 4.0211] [b]. Interestingly, "information items referred to the CID are often
received from disgruntled persons" such as ex-employces, revenge-bound relatives
such as ex-spouses, or reward-minded citizens. Id43 Ida
5Id.; seeSALTZJtAN, supra note 8, 1 12.03[1].
"I CohnsmE-r AL, supra note 7, 14.02[11] [a]. Cases are frequently referred to the
CID by the Examination Division, the Collection Division and the Employee Plans
and Exempt Organizations (EP/EO) Divisions of the IRS. Id. "Referral is deemed
appropriate when a substantial liability exists that a taxpayer refuses to pay, a pattern
of delinquency exists ... or a delinquency in filing or payment relates to income from
illegal sources." Id. The CID then proceeds with the case selection process. Id.
"During the 1990s, the CID attempted to improve its case selection process. . . [by]
choosing cases that possessed the greatest deterrent effect." Id. 1.0117]. These
cases generally involved "sophisticated criminal schemes and high-dollar financial
transactions." Id. The IRS "may be more likely to press a case involving
a.. .prominent taxpayer than a relatively obscure person." Lee G. Knight & Ray A.
Knight, Criminal Tax Fraud: An Analytical Review, 57 Mo. L REv. 175, 178 (1992). But
see TRAC, IRS at Work: Enforcement Trends Over Time, available at
http://vw.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/national/ratesTb3.htm (last visited Nov.
2, 2001) (reporting that in recent years, the number of IRS audits for high income
taxpayers continues its precipitous decline).
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trator.52 In tax cases, however, the government knows the iden-
tity of the alleged perpetrator and seeks to amass incriminating
information.53 The most damaging evidence in these tax pro-
ceedings typically comes from sources close to the taxpayer such
as accountants, bankers, or most worrisome, from the taxpayer
himself."'
To understand both the potential transgressions of IRS
agents and the vulnerability of the tax defendant in a criminal
tax case, it is important to examine the process that IRS agents
follow in such criminal cases. The CID operates through its in-
vestigators, who are known as "special agents" . Their functions
include detecting criminal violations and determining whether
they should recommend a criminal prosecution. 6 A special
agent is a highly trained criminal investigator who seeks to un-
earth evidence to establish elements of tax offenses such as fail-
ure to file, filing of a false return, tax evasion, or money-
laundering. Special agents, like other criminal law enforce-
ment agents but unlike their civil division counterparts, carry
firearms and badges.58
When a special agent receives a matter that potentially war-
rants criminal prosecution or further inquiry,59 he or she con-
12 Scott Sandstrom, Tax Fraud Investigations: An Overview for Accountants, Attorneys,
and Other Professional Tax Advisors, 64 TAXFs 718,719 (1986).
5 3 d. at 719.
I d. American taxpayers are required to comply with IRS investigations that deal
with the correctness of any return as filed, or investigations that focus on transactions
which may have potential tax exposure. Id. The Internal Revenue Code provides the
IRS with broad authority to discover information that is "relevant" to a tax investiga-
tion. Id. Upon a surprise visit by a special agent, taxpayers "sometimes make damag-
ing post-offense admissions or independently prosecutable false statements."
SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 4.04[2]. See also KOSTMLAN , supra note 1, at 115 ("Every
special agent knows that the surest way to cement his case is to get the taxpayer to
talk.").
' COMISKEYET AL., supra note 7, 4.0212].
Id. 4.0212], 4.03 ("Through the CID, the IRS recommends criminal prosecu-
tion in cases where there is adequate evidence to indicate sufficient intent and proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
-7d. 4.02(21; see also SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 12.01 ("Unlike an Examination
Division revenue agent and a Collection Division revenue officer, the CID special
agent neither determines the correct tax owed by a taxpayer nor collects that tax";
rather, his primary purpose is to gather evidence for later use in a successful prosecu-
tion.).
"' United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1070 (1999).
" Cowsiis' ET AL., supra note 7, 4.02 (determining whether a case is acceptable
for investigation by the CID (commonly referred to asjacketing or numbering) and
[Vol. 9 1
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ducts a full-scale administrative investigation to gather all perti-
nent evidence to prove or disprove the existence of a violation.60
In a criminal investigation, standard procedure includes a sur-
prise visit to the taxpayer's residence or business by the investi-
gating special agent.6' The surprise interrogation is often the
moment at which the taxpayer first learns of the criminal in-
quiry.61 The principal purpose of this initial interview is for the
special agent to obtain information-including oral testimony,
documents and records-usually available only from the tax-
payer.
Upon the initial non-custodial contact with the taxpayer,
the investigator must identify himself as a special agent of the
IRS and advise the taxpayer that the taxpayer is under criminal
investigation. While not constitutionally required,o IRM
guidelines mandate that special agents recite an administrative,
Miranda-like warning 6 to the taxpayer during this initial non-
custodial contact, prior to soliciting information from taxpay-
ers.' This warning informs the taxpayer of his or her constitu-
whether prosecution is ultimately recommended, is almost entirely the prerogative of
a special agent).
KosmELANxrz, supra note 1, at 61; see also CoMISK EY T AL, supra note 7, 1 4.04.
The CID gathers information to show: (1) net worth or expenditures by a taxpayer
are inconsistent with reported income suggesting unreported income or money
laundering-, (2) overstatement of deductions or expenses on a filed return; (3) failure
to file a required return; (4) improper preparation of a tax return; (5) violations in
the operation of a tax-exempt organization or employee plan or trust; (6) overt ac-
tion indicating an intent to violate laws under the jurisdiction of the IRS; and (7) ille-
gal activity having potential tax or money-laundering consequences. it.
r' DARRELL, MCGOWENETAL, 1 CRMINALAND CIVILTAX FRAUD § 4.01 (1986).
62 COMI S :ETAL, supra note 7, at 8.03.
IRM § 9323.1 (1999).
' IRM CI Handbook [9.4] 1.6 (June 30, 1998) (cited in COMIsEYET AL, supra note
7, 4.04[2]) (At the beginning of the meeting, the agent must advise the taxpayer of
the following- "As a special agent, one of my functions is to investigate the possibility
of criminal violations of the Internal Revenue laws and related offenses.").
See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1976) (holding that Miranda
warnings are not required when interviewing taxpayer under investigation if question-
ing does not deprive person of his freedom of action in any significant way); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (explaining that warnings of taxpayers' constitu-
tional rights are required only when any suspect is subjected to custodial interroga-
tion).
'Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
' IRM CI Handbook [9.4] 5.11.3.1.1, [9..4] 5.11.3.1.3 (June 30, 1998) (cited m
COl~sREET AL, supra note 7, 4.04[2]). For an analysis of Cm-issued Miranda wrarn-
ings and cases, see Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
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tional right to remain silent.s The agent must terminate the in-
terview if the subject indicates the desire to invoke his or her
rights.0 Notwithstanding these warnings, confronted taxpayers
often waive their rights and speak freely, to their detriment, with
the special agents. The reason for this cooperation is that sus-
pect taxpayers often do not understand the danger or signifi-
cance of their testimony.7' They do not understand that the
agent may later use the taxpayer's testimony during a criminal
investigation against him.72
IRS regulations encourage special agents to employ their
credentials, rather than summonses, to obtain information from
taxpayers. 7s Nonetheless, agents routinely issue administrative
summonses to obtain a suspect taxpayer's books and records for
use in their investigations.74 Upon completion of the investiga-
tion, if the special agent believes that the matter merits prosecu-
tion, the agent must prepare a special agent's report ("SAR")
explaining the details and results of the investigation, and the
agent's recommendations. 75 Finally, the special agent must refer
the matter to the IRS District Counsel, who refers the case to
the Criminal Section of the Department of Justice Tax Divi-
sion,76 or directly to the U.S. Attorney where authorized."
' IRM CI Handbook [9.4] 5.11.3.1.1, [9..4] 5.11.3.1.3 (June 30, 1998) (cited in
COMISKEYET AL., supra note 7, 4.04[2]) ("The warnings given are essentially the so-
called Miranda warnings, except the right to have appointed counsel is not men-
tioned.")69
.red.
70 United States v. Meier, 607 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966
(1980).
7, SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 12.0312] [b].
7id,
73 'd
7' See I.RC. § 7602 (1994) (authorizing an IRS agent to examine any books, rec-
ords or other data and to take such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or ma-
terial to such inquiry); CoMISItEYET AL., supra note 7, 4.04[4] (recognizing that the
issuance and enforcement of a summons, properly exercised on "official curiosity",
need not be supported by probable cause). Note that special agents may also issue
administrative summonses to third parties, and the taxpayer will usually receive notice
of summonses served on third-party recordkeepers. SALTzMAN, supra note 8,
12.03[2] [b].
' COMIsKEYET AL., supra note 7, 1 4.02[3] [a] (not all criminal investigations war-
rant prosecution; investigations which involve flagrant violations with high prosecu-
tion potential and deterrent impact on compliance, are clearly favored); see also IRM
§§ 9131 (1999).
76 The Tax Division of the Justice Department is responsible for authorizing and
overseeing almost all criminal tax prosecutions under IRS laws. COMISKEY ET AL., supra
note 7, 1 1.04.
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C. SILENT TRANSITION OF A CIVIL AUDIT INTO A CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING
While informants, other government agencies, and even the
Collection Division of the IRS are regular sources of informa-
tion about potential tax evaders for the CID, the civil audit re-
ferral is the most common catalyst for a criminal investigation.5
During the course of a routine audit, when an IRS revenue
agent examines the books and records of a taxpayer, the agent
often unearths evidence of fraudulent reporting by the taxpayer
if such evidence exists. IRS regulations mandate, however, that
when a revenue agent suspects fraud during the course of a civil
audit, he or she must immediately suspend the audit and refer
the case to the CID for processing." Specifically, Section
4565.21 of the IRS Internal Revenue Manual (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "IRM" or "the Manual") states that:
If, during an examination, an examiner [i.e., revenue agent] un-
covers a potentially fraudulent situation caused by the taxpayer and or
the preparer, the examiner shall discuss the case at the earliest possible
convenience with his/her group manager .... Once there is a firm indi-
cation of criminal fraud all examination activity shall be suspended .... '
Because the American legal system invokes strict constitu-
tional safeguards to protect individuals subject to criminal inves-
tigations,' it is critical that IRS regulations prevent its civil
agents from garnering evidence for a criminal prosecution dur-
ing the course of a civil investigation. IRS agents cannot be
' SALmANT, supra note 8, 12.06. The District Counsel's decision is pivotal: If the
district CID recommendation is approved, the case is sent to the Criminal Section of
the Department ofJustice Tax Division, where the Attorney General is responsible for
the prosecution of criminal tax cases. Id. If prosecution is declined, the case is re-
turned to the district Examination Division or Collection Division as a civil tax case.
Id,
ILL
' IRM § 4565.21 (1999). It is IRS policy that criminal action in a case takes prece-
dence over its civil aspects and that any civil enforcement action involving the same
tax as a criminal case is suspended until the criminal aspects of the case are closed.
S L.'rzAN, supra note 8, 12.01.
IRM § 4565.21 (1999) (emphasis added). Note that IRM § 4565.21 and IRM §
9311.83 further the same purpose. "Therefore, if a revenue agent continues to con-
duct a civil audit after developing 'firm indications of fraud,' a court may justifiably
conclude that the IRS agent was in fact conducting a criminal investigation under the
auspices of a civil audit." United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999).
" These include the right to remain silent, U.S. CONsT. amend. V, and the right to
obtain representation from counsel, U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
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permitted to circumvent the constitutional protections granted
during the course of a criminal investigation merely by conduct-
ing a civil audit. To this end, IRM Section 9311.83 reinforces
IRM Section 4565.21, and explicitly prohibits "a revenue agent
from developing a criminal case against a taxpayer under the
guise of a civil investigation." 2
However, determining whether a revenue agent is conduct-
ing a criminal investigation under the auspice of a civil audit is
complex. Specifically, the revenue agent is cautioned not to
discontinue the examination until discovery of a "firm indica-
tion of fraud,"8 3 but, as later discussed, the definition of a "firm
indication of fraud" is vague and difficult to understand. 8 IRS
regulations outline typical fraud indicators that the revenue
agent can identify during the course of the investigation."'
Nonetheless, instructions require the revenue agent to exercise
extraordinary judgment as to when an investigation should be
discontinued. The agent must discontinue the investigation at
"the earliest opportunity" and can do so without disclosing the
reason for suspending the audit to the taxpayer. 8 The "earliest
opportunity," however, does not mean "immediately."87
The juncture where a civil audit turns criminal is not always
clear. 88 The nebulous "firm indication of fraud" requirement is
both problematic for the revenue agent to apply, and particu-
larly dangerous from the perspective of the taxpayer. Revenue
agents sometimes perform the same functions of evidence gath-
ering as their criminal division counterparts, and the IRS often
offers this evidence in a criminal trial to the detriment of the
taxpayer."9 The situation that taxpayers fear is that they will
"IRM § 9311.83 (1999).
"Id § 4565.21.
"See discussion infra Section 1V.B.1.
85 IRM Fraud Handbook (104.2] 2.2 (May 19, 1999) (these "badges of fraud" in-
clude: understatement of income; unexplained substantial increase in net worth; ficti-
tious or improper deductions; concealment of bank or brokerage accounts;
accounting irregularities; and improper allocation of income); United States v.
McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing IRM provisions).
"SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 8.06[7]; see also United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445,
456 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[a] firm indication of fraud must be distinguished from a first
indication of fraud"), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999).
,SAizMAN, supra note 8, 8.06(7].
McKee, 192 F.3d at 535 (noting that "the substantive distinction between an IRS
civil audit and a criminal tax investigation is not always clear").
'9 Id. at 544.
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permit an IRS agent to examine their books and records during
the course of a routine audit, and the civil agent will subse-
quently use this information in a criminal prosecution. '" Cases
involving this scenario are numerous.9'
Although a large pecuniary penalty is a severe blow to a tax-
payer, the stigma imposed on a taxpayer as a result of a criminal
prosecution-even if the taxpayer is found wholly innocent-is
a much greater hardship.92 Consequently, taxpayers are under-
"The following excerpt, from an affidavit submitted by a taxpayer in United States
v. Marra, 481 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1973), supporting his motion to suppress evidence
that was allegedly obtained by an IRS agent under the auspice of a routine civil tax
audit, exemplifies this point:
2. In the latter part of 1967 and the first two months of 1968, Revenue Agent Bruce
Norvell was conducting an audit of my 1965 and 1966 tax returns, and for the most
part, obtained relevant information from my accountant, Edward Derbabia, C.P.A.
3. I was informed by my accountant at several points in time during this period that
the Agent was requesting certain information, and I supplied whatever I had avail-
able to my accountant which I believed he would submit to the Revenue Agent.
4. In the latter part of February, 1968, I was made aware through my accountant that
the Revenue Agent had submitted a list of proposed adjustments, these being items
which I understood he was disagreeing with and planning to change.
5. As a result of this turn of events, I believed that the Agent was in the process of dos-
ing the case and that there was no cause for concern that a criminal investigation
was taking place or would take place.
6. When I received the two letters from the Internal Revenue Agent in July of 1968. 1
was completely convinced that no criminal investigation would ensue, because the
wording in these letters gave me the impression that the Agent was finally closing
the case.
7. As a result of the foregoing, I was wrongfully deceitd, falsely misled to misreprilntatin,
both active and passive and surreptitious induced to give statements and provide
documents and records in contravention of my rights under the Fourth. Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.
Marra, 481 F.2d at 1200-01.
" See, e.g., United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Peters, 153 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999); United States
v. Wadena, 152 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1050 (1999); United
States v. Grunewald, 987 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d
495 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Powell, 835 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1988); Grader v.
United States, 816 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Serlin, 707 F.2d 953 (7th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Meier, 607 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
966 (1980); United States v. Nuth, 605 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Allen, 522 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.
1975); United States v. Marra, 481 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Leh-
man, 468 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d
Cir. 1959); United States v. Piper, 681 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Ga. 1988).
For example, the tax evasion statute, I.LRC. § 7201 (2001) imposes the heaviest
penalty of any tax offense described in the Code. SALTzmAN, supra note 8, 7.02[4].
A person convicted of tax evasion is subject to imprisonment of up to five years, a fine
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93
standably fearful of the true nature of an examination. If an
IRS agent violates IRM Section 4565.21 by conducting a crimi-
nal investigation under the auspice of a civil audit, potential
constitutional violations may arise.' To prevail in asserting such
violations, however, the taxpayer must be allowed to base a chal-
lenge to a tax conviction on the IRS's alleged noncompliance
with its procedures.
II. LEGAL EFFECT OF IRS REGULATIONS
To determine whether an IRS agent's noncompliance with
IRS agency regulations results in a constitutional infringement
on a taxpayer, it is imperative to discern whether these IRS
regulations safeguard taxpayers' constitutional rights. Thus, the
courts must first examine whether the IRM guarantees substan-
tive rights of taxpayers, or comparatively, whether the IRM is
merely a set of internal administrative procedures which govern
the affairs of the IRS. 95 If the IRM safeguards a taxpayer's sub-
stantive rights, then a taxpayer may challenge a conviction on
an IRS agent's noncompliance with its procedures. 6 This sec-
tion begins by examining the IRM and the current split of
authority regarding its legal effect. The section concludes that
if a provision of the Manual affects a taxpayer's substantive
rights, any violation of that provision is a per se constitutional
infringement.
A. THE INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (IRM)
The IRM is an internal document of the IRS, which details
procedures that an IRS agent must follow while conducting a
civil tax audit or criminal investigation. 97 The IRM serves as the
single official compilation of policies, procedures, instructions
and guidelines relating to the organization, function, admini-
of up to $10,000 or both, together with the costs of prosecutions. Id. Apart from the
sentence, as a convicted felon, the taxpayer may suffer such disabilities as loss of the
right to vote, hold public office, obtain certain jobs, retain professional licenses, etc.
I&L
93 KO ANETZ, supra note 1, at 72.
" See discussion infra Section III.B.
95 McKee, 192 F.3d at 540 (stating that courts "must initially address whether a tax-
payer may properly base a challenge to a tax conviction on the IRS's alleged non-
compliance with the procedures of its Manual").
See id., at 540-41.
SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 3.04[6].
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stration and operation of the IRSY9s Not only does it contain all
policies and instructions that the IRS issues to its employees, but
it also functions as an important tool for taxpayers and practi-
tioners alike.99 The Manual allows taxpayers and tax practitio-
ners to know what they can expect from the IRS during
investigations, including the procedures that they can expect
IRS agents to follow while examining tax returns, and the proc-
ess a taxpayer must follow to file an appeal.'0 Most importantly,
the IRM instructs taxpayers and practitioners to recognize when
the IRS is not following its procedures.''
While it is clear that the IRM details procedures that an IRS
agent must follow in conducting a civil or criminal tax investiga-
tion, whether the Manual constitutionally safeguards a tax-
payer's rights is unclear. The Supreme Court first addressed the
legal effect of IRM provisions in the landmark case, United States
v. Caceres.1 " Due to conflicting interpretations of Caceres, how-
ever, appellate courts are currently split as to the legal status of
the IRM. Some courts have held that the provisions of the
Manual only govern the internal affairs of the IRS, and there-
fore do not have the force or effect of law.'0 3 According to these
courts, a taxpayer may not properly base a challenge to a tax
conviction on the IRS's alleged noncompliance with the proce-
dures of its Manual. 14 Other courts, however, have held that the
rules of the IRS, like the rules of every other government
agency, have the effect of law and bind agents to adhere to
these laws when they involve taxpayers' constitutional rights.'V'
A violation of these Manual provisions is therefore a per se con-
stitutional infringement on a taxpayer's rights.
0 Id. 1 3.04[6].
Id. 8.06[1]. The IRS has also developed basic and detailed techniques in the
IRM to ensure that the revenue agent has considered all areas necessary for a proper
determination of tax liability. Id. Techniques discussed in the IR.M apply in all field
examinations. Id.; see Bryan E. Gates, The Internal Revenue Manual--the Practitioner's
Too4 82 Tax Notes, 358, Jan. 18, 1999. The Manual includes various handbooks for
personnel, such as the Handbook for Revenue Officers and the Handbook for Special
Agents. SALTlZMAN, supra note 8, 7 3.04[6].
1 SAI.TZMAN, supra note 8, 3.04[6]
101 Id.
2440 U.S. 741 (1979). See discussion infraSection II.B.
"3 See cases cited infra note 119.
'' See cases cited infra note 119.
" See cases cited infra note 128.
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B. AUTHORITATIVE SUPREME COURT CASE: UNITED STATES V.
CACERES
In Caceres, a disgruntled taxpayer challenged the legal im-
pact of IRM provisions. The taxpayer claimed that an IRS
agent recorded statements of the taxpayer alleged bribing the
agent, via a concealed radio-transmitter.107  He moved to sup-
press these tape recordings from subsequent criminal investiga-
tion proceedings on the grounds that the evidence was obtained
in violation of IRM regulations.' 8 Specifically, the taxpayer al-
leged that the IRS agent failed to obtain requisite authorizations
from the Department of Justice, allowing tape recordings with-
out the taxpayer's consent.' 09
Although in blatant violation of the IRM provisions, the
Caceres Court nonetheless held that the tape recordings of the
alleged bribery of an IRS agent by a taxpayer were admissible in
the subsequent criminal investigation."0- In admitting the tapes,
the Court distinguished internal rules of agency procedure from
regulations promulgated pursuant to a statutory directive for a
taxpayer's benefit." The Court thus rejected a per se rule that
every violation of the IRM was tantamount to a constitutional
due process violation." 2 The Court relied on the notion that
the particular IRM provision at bar was not promulgated for the
benefit of taxpayers, and neither the Constitution nor any Act of
Congress required that official governmental approval be se-
cured before conversations are recorded by government
agents.113
106 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
'07 Id at 743 (taxpayer moved to suppress these recordings on the ground that the
authorizations required by the IRS regulations had not been secured by the Depart-
ment of'Justice, as required in the IRM).
108 Id.
109 II9 d.
. Id at 757; see also United States v. Irvine, 699 F.2d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1983) (follow-
ing Caceres in finding that agent's violation of IRS regulations did not warrant sup-
pression of evidence obtained at interview).
. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 748-50.
12 Id at 750-57.
"' Id. at 744. The Caceres Court also noted that no federal statutes require "that of-
ficial approval be secured before conversations are overheard or recorded by Gov-
ernment agents with the consent of one of the conversants." Id. (citing United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion)). Furthermore, the Constitu-
tion does not protect the privacy of the individuals in respondent's situation because
if an agent can write down his conversations with a defendant, for official use, and
testify regarding their contents without a warrant authorizing his encounters, no dif-
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By holding that evidence obtained in patent violation of
agency procedures was admissible in a criminal prosecution, the
Caceres opinion sparked heated debate."'4 Justice Marshall, in his
dissenting opinion joined by Justice Brennan, declared that lax
enforcement of IRS rules would lead to increased IRS agent
misconduct, because taxpayers cannot reasonably rely on rules
that are ignored."5 He was concerned that with such unaware-
ness, mandatory regulations prescribed by the IRS may become
nothing more than "hortatory policies."" Recently, the dispa-
rate viewpoints among the circuit courts have begun to mirror
the incongruity among the majority and dissenters in Caceres.
C. SEVERAL CIRCUITS VIEW THE IRM MERELY AS A SET OF
OPERATING PROCEDURES
Several circuits have broadly held that IRM provisions gov-
ern only the internal affairs and proceedings of the IRS, and
consequently, lack the force and effect of law. In the early case
of United States v. Mapp, the Seventh Circuit first stated that IRS
manuals are generally adopted for the internal administration
of the IRS, and not for the protection of taxpayers."7 The court
held that internal IRS regulations confer no substantive rights
on taxpayers. Accordingly, the Mafp court denied the tax-
payer's motion for suppression of evidence. " B
Several courts have since adopted the perspective of Mapp,
interpreting the Caceres opinion, once issued, as reinforcement
for the broad proposition that the IRM does not constitute
agency regulations promulgated for the benefit of taxpayers."
9
ferent result is required if the agent, instead of reporting and transcribing his conver-
sations, simultaneously records them. Id. at 750.
114 See Caceres, 440 U.S. at 757-70 (Marshallj., dissenting).
tId. at 762 (Marshall,J, dissenting).
,'Id.
"7 United States v. Mapp, 561 F.2d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v.
Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417, 420-21 (10th Cir. 1971)).
118 1&
'" See, e.g., Crystal v. United States, 172 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting
that courts are of the view that internal rules of agency procedure confer no substan-
tive rights on taxpayers); United States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d 495, 499 (1st Cir. 1988);
Groder v. United States, 816 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the IRM is
merely a set of operating procedures); United States v, Home, 714 F.2d 206, 207 (1st
Cir. 1983) (noting that provisions in the IRS Manual are not codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations; they govern the internal affairs of the IRS and do not have the
force or effect of law); United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1243 (10th Cir. 1983)
(stating that violation of IRS audit handbook rules on fraud referral does not prove a
717
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The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Groder120 stated that the
IRM, as an internal operating manual, governs only the internal
affairs of the IRS and its provisions confer "no substantive rights
or privileges upon taxpayers." 2 ' Adhering strictly to the Caceres
decision, the court relied on the general notion that internal
operating manuals neither bind an agency, nor confer rights
upon the respective regulated entity.' The effect of the IRM
provisions, the court stated, is "to regulate the flow of business
between different units of the IRS and not to provide a legal
cause of action or means of redress for individual taxpayers.
'' 21
Consequently, an alleged violation of a regulation by an IRS
agent would neither prevent prosecution or conviction of a de-
fendant, nor confer substantive constitutional rights on the tax-
124payer.
D. BETTER VIEW: IRM PROVISIONS CONFER SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
ON TAXPAYERS IF THEY CONCERN TAXPAYERS' CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
According to the circuits following the reasoning of Mapp,
Groder, and their progeny, a taxpayer may not properly base a
challenge to a tax conviction on an IRS agent's alleged non-
compliance with the procedures of the IRM.'2 However, by
holding that the IRS may admit evidence obtained in patent vio-
lation of all agency procedures in a criminal prosecution, these
circuits were misguided. Moreover, post-Caceres courts relying
on the Caceres opinion read its holding too broadly. The better
view is that the IRM confers substantive rights on taxpayers, at
the very least, where those provisions concern taxpayers' consti-
violation of taxpayers' constitutional rights); United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417,
420-21 (10th Cir. 1971).
' 816 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1987).
121 Id. at 142.
122 Id.; see also Reich v. Manganas, 70 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1995) (OSHA Field
Operation Manual, as an internal operating manual, "do[es] not carry the force of
law, bind the agency, or confer rights upon the regulated entity"); Schweiker v. Han-
sen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) (Social Security Claims Manual is an internal handbook
for internal use only for Social Security Act employees, and therefore has no legal ef-
fect, nor does it bind the agency).
'" Id. at 142. The Groder court also noted that "[t]here are many such rules and
procedures in government which agencies must remain free to adopt without fear of
creating a litigable point on the part of every person with whom the agency comes in
contact." Id.
124 See cases cited supra note 119.
" See cases cited supra note 119.
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tutional rights. Together, the language in the majority opinion
of Caceres, the reasoning of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Cir-
cuits, and the persuasive arguments espoused by Justice Mar-
shall in the Caceres dissenting opinion, support this standpoint.
In Caceres, Judge Stevens stated in his majority opinion that
a "court's duty to enforce an agency regulation is most evident
when compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Con-
stitution or federal law."1 2  The Court thereby acknowledged
the possibility that a federal court might enforce an agency
regulation when that 9rovision protects a constitutional or fed-
erally protected right. Consequently, a taxpayer may properly
challenge a tax convictionwhere an IRS agent violates a provi-
sion of its Manual designed to protect the constitutional rights
of taxpayers.
The Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits adopted this inter-
pretation of Caceres.128 Most recently, in United States v. McKee, t
the Sixth Circuit, joining the viewpoint of several other cir-
cuits30 and reversing its own line of precedent,"' held that a
" United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749 (1979).
2id.
'2a See, e.g., United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 1999) (affording
substantive consideration to the provisions of the Manual where they protect taxpay-
ers' constitutional rights); United States v. Meier, 607 F.2d 215, 217 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980). Moreover, other courts have opined that a taxpayer
may challenge a conviction by relying on the Manual's provisions so long as the tax-
payer's challenge was based on an alleged violation of a constitutional right. See
United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1070
(1999); United States v. Grunewald, 987 F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993). The Sixth,
Seventh and Eighth Circuits are not alone in their viewpoint. See United States v.
Knight, 898 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Caldwell, 820 F.2d 1395,
1399 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1970) (allowing due process claim where
the special agent failed to give taxpayer certain warnings as provided in the Manual
that he was the subject of criminal investigation).
192 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. The McKee court noted that although this relevant portion of the Home opin-
ion was only dicta in the opinion, then-Judge Breyer was a member of the Home
panel, and deferred to his views. Id. at 535. Moreover, the McKee court noted that
since the Seventh and Eighth Circuits held that a taxpayer may challenge a conviction
by relying on the Manual's provisions if the taxpayer's challenge was based on an al-
leged violation of a constitutional right, "we will proceed accordingly." Id.; see cases
cited supra note 128.
... Valen Mfg. Co. v. United States, 90 F.3d 1190 (6th Cir. 1996). In Valen Mfg. Co.,
the taxpayer argued that the assessments levied against him for delinquent filings
were invalid because the Manual suggested that his conduct was excused. Id. at 1191.
The Court rejected this argument as meritless, noting that the "provisions of the
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court may overturn a tax-related conviction if the IRS violates a
provision in its Manual designed to protect the constitutional
rights of taxpayers.'32 Using the aperture in the Caceres decision,
the McKee court recognized that the IRM confers substantive
rights to taxpayers if such regulations concern individual rights
protected by the Constitution.""3 Thus, where a taxpayer chal-
lenges a tax conviction obtained in violation of an IRS regula-
tion that is mandated by the Constitution or federal law, a
federal court may enforce those IRS provisions. 34
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Caceres, also
supports the proposition that IRM provisions confer substantive
rights on taxpayers, at least where those provisions safeguard
taxpayers' constitutional rights. Justice Marshall insisted that in
a long line of cases beginning with Bridges v. Wixon, 5  the Su-
preme Court has held that a citizen under investigation "is le-
gally entitled to insist upon the observance of rules"
promulgated by an executive or legislative body.35 Underlying
this decision and the line of cases which follows, is the due pro-
cess tenet that rules of law bind the government no less than
private citizens. 3 7 That an agency must abide by its own policies
and regulations is not limited to rules attaining the status of
formal regulations. 34 Indeed, an agency is not required to fol-
[IRS's] manual.., only govern the internal affairs of the Internal Revenue Service.
They do not have the force and effect of law." Id at 1194.
132 McKee, 192 F.3d at 541-42.
13 Id.
'3 Id. at 540-41 (stating that "the Manual's provisions are, at the very least, relevant
in determining whether a taxpayer's constitutional rights have been offended").
326 U.S. 135, 152-53 (1945).
' United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 757 (1979) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Bridges, 326 U.S. 135 (holding invalid a deportation ordered on the basis of
statements which did not comply with the Immigration Service's rules requiring oaths
and signatures, finding that the rules were designed to "afford [the alien] due process
of law" by providing "safeguards against essentially unfair procedures"); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974)
("Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow
their own procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are possibly
more rigorous than otherwise would be required."); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S.
109, 144 (1963) (agency "may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or vio-
late fundamental rights .... ."); United States ex rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S.
260 (1954)).
"37 Caceres, 440 U.S. at 757 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Where individual interests
are implicated, the Due Process Clause requires that an executive agency adhere to
the standards by which it professes its action to be judged.").
"a Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991); Morton, 415 U.S. at 235
("Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow
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low an internal rule if it only concerns the internal administra-
don of the agency."5 9  However, Justice Marshall urged that
where an individual right is affected by agency deviation from
established rule, the agency must follow that rule even if it con-
cerns only internal agency procedure. "'
It is understandable that courts may be unwilling to hold
that every violation of an IRM provision should be litigated.
However, taxpayers must be able to challenge a tax conviction
where an IRS agent failed to comply with IRM procedures that
safeguard taxpayers' constitutional rights. To deny a taxpayer
liberties protected by the United States Constitution would be
intolerable.1
4 1
ll. IRM SECTION 4565.21 Is DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF TAXPAYERS
IRS regulations explicitly prohibit a revenue agent from de-
veloping a criminal case against a taxpayer under the guise of a
civil audit.14 ' To this end, IRM Section 4565.21 directs a revenue
agent to suspend his or her civil investigation upon discovery of
a "firm indication of fraud," and turn the matter over to the CID
for criminal investigation.' Whether a taxpayer may properly
challenge a tax conviction based on an IRS agent's alleged non-
compliance with this IRM provision, however, depends upon
their own procedures."); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316
U.S. 407, 422 (1942) (stating that agency regulations on which individuals are "enti-
tled to rely" bind the agency and are therefore ripe forjudicial review).
... See, e.g., United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417, 420-21 (10th Cir. 1971):
We do not say that agencies always violate due process when they fail to adhere to their
procedures. It is important here that the procedure set forth in the news release was an
agency wide directive designed to protect taxpayers by setting a clear and uniform stan-
dard governing the first contact between a Special Agent and a tax fraud suspect. Our re-
sult would have been different if the I.R.S. had violated a procedure designed to
promote some other agency goal.
' See cases cited supra note 136.
"' Caceres, 440 U.S. at 758 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Where individual interests
are implicated, the Due Process Clause requires that an executive agency adhere to
the standards by which it professes its action to bejudged.").
" IRM § 4565.21 should be read in conjunction with IRM § 9311.83, which pro-
hibits a "revenue agent from developing a criminal case against a taxpayer under the
guise of a civil investigation," because both provisions further the same purpose of
ensuring that an IRS revenue agent turns the case over to the CID upon a "firm indi-
cation of fraud."
"'IRM § 4565.21 (1999).
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whether this particular IRM provision is designed to protect
taxpayers' constitutional rights. If IRM Section 4565.21 safe-
guards taxpayers' constitutional rights, then a taxpayer may
challenge a tax conviction based on alleged noncompliance
with its rules.4 The circuits, however, have not unanimously re-
solved the legal status of this provision.
This section begins by discussing the current split of author-
ity over the legal affect of IRM Section 4565.21. The section ar-
gues that IRM Section 4565.21 safeguards a taxpayer's Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights such that a taxpayer may challenge
a tax conviction where an IRS agent conducts a criminal investi-
gation under the guise of a civil audit.
A. SOME COURTS HOLD THAT IRM SECTION 4565.21 IS ONLYA
PROCEDURAL RULE
Some courts have held that IRM Section 4565.21 confers no
substantive rights or privileges upon taxpayers. The Fourth Cir-
cuit in Groder v. United States,' adhered to this viewpoint. In
Groder, the taxpayer alleged that the IRS agent "mousetrapped"
the taxpayer into providing information that he would not have
provided if he had known that a future criminal investigation
was pending.'4 6 The taxpayer asserted that the IRS agent there-
fore failed to follow internal procedures under IRM Section
4565.21 by effectively conducting a criminal investigation under
the guise of a civil audit.
147
The Groder court, however, held that Section 4565.21 of the
Manual was only a procedural rule of the IRS and therefore
conferred no substantive rights or privileges upon the tax-
payer. 4 8 The court stated that a violation of an IRS guideline, by
itself, was without legal effect.' In order to prevail, a taxpayer
144 Id.
" 816 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1987). The Fourth Circuit is not alone in its view-
point. SeeUnited States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d 495, 499 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that an
agent's violation of IRM §4565.21 "does not prevent prosecution and conviction of a
defendant, nor does it require suppression of evidence."); United States v. Kaatz, 705
F.2d 1237, 1243 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating that a violation of IRS audit handbook rules
on fraud referral does not prove a violation of taxpayers' constitutional rights).
146 Groder, 816 F.2d at 141.
147 id.
14 Id. at 142 (stating that a "violation of a guideline such as this one is... by itself,
without legal effect to suppress evidence at a criminal trial").
,4 Id. (attempting to distinguish internal rules of agency procedure from regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to statutory directive for a taxpayer's benefit).
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must prove more than a mere violation of the IRM."9 The tax-
payer must demonstrate that the government proceeded in bad
faith'51-typically involving fraud or deceit on behalf of the gov-
ernment -- not simply an agent acting unreasonably or unsatis-
factorily. Here, the court found that the taxpayer failed to
prove bad faith on the part of the IRS agent and, accordingly,
denied the taxpayer's claim.'*5
By holding bad faith as the standard that a taxpayer must es-
tablish in order to claim that the revenue agent has violated the
taxpayer's constitutional rights, however, the Groder court and
its progeny were misguided. Bad faith on the part of an IRS
agent could be viewed as a direct constitutional infringement on
a taxpayer in and of itself. Critically, the court overemphasized
the importance of any "intentional" misconduct on the part of
the revenue agent. Rather, whether the revenue agent acted
"intentionally" is irrelevant, since the effect on the taxpayer is
the same-the taxpayer is injured. Intent of the revenue agent
would be pertinent if the revenue agent himself could be li-
able,'5 but not here, where the agent is a representative of the
government.
B. BETTER VIEW: IRM SECTION 4565.21 SAFEGUARDS TAXPAYERS'
FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
IRM Section 4565.21 certainly performs the function of an
internal operating rule by detailing the procedures that an IRS
agent must follow after developing a firm indication of fraud on
'0 lId ("There are many such rules and procedures in government which agencies
must remain free to adopt without fear of creating a litigable point on the part of
every person with whom the agency comes in contact."); see United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971); United
States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 313-14 (1978).
1-1 Groder, 816 F.2d at 144 (noting that even if assumedly, the IRS violated its Man-
ual, the district court found that the taxpayer failed to prove that the government
proceeded against him in bad faith).
2 Id. (citing United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1243 (10th Cir. 1983)). In this
situation, "bad faith would arise if a revenue agent misrepresented to the taxpayer the
possibility of referral in order to elicit information for use in a fraud investigation."
Id However, the IRS's violation of its own regulations "is not proof by itself of bad
faith in a tax investigation. Id. (citing United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 611 F.2d
492, 500 (4th Cir. 1979)).
's3 Ic at 144.




behalf of a taxpayer.' 5 However, IRM Section 4565.21 inher-
ently performs another role as well. By mandating that a civil
revenue agent suspend his audit upon a discovery of fraud and
refer the case to the agent's criminal division counterpart for
prosecution, IRM Section 4565.21 recognizes that significantly
different rights, responsibilities, and expectations apply to civil
audits compared to criminal tax investigations. Referral of a tax
investigation to the CID ensures that taxpayers receive special
constitutional safeguards, such as notification of the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel, by CID special agents.',
Thus, IRM Section 4565.21 effects the important function of
safeguarding these rights as well.
For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit, in United States v.
McKee,15 7 recently held that IRM Section 4565.21 recognizes that
the IRS must protect the individual and constitutional rights of
taxpayers. ' "It would be a flagrant disregard of individuals'
rights to deliberately deceive, or even lull, taxpayers into in-
criminating themselves during an audit when activities of an ob-
viously criminal nature are under investigation. ""' 9 In holding
that the IRM confers substantive rights on taxpayers, the McKee
court noted that several other courts have urged that a tax con-
viction "may be overturned if the IRS is found to have violated a
provision in its Manual 'designed to protect the constitutional
rights of taxpayers. ' '"l These courts have alluded to the notion
that an IRS agent's failure to adhere to IRM Section 4565.21, by
... IRM § 4565.21 (1999).
" See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
'57 192 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 1999).
" Id. at 541. In McKee, the taxpayer appealed her conviction for tax fraud on the
grounds that the evidence against her should be suppressed because the IRS failed to
comply with its own regulations during the course of its investigation, and therefore
violated her constitutional rights. Id. The taxpayer specifically alleged that the IRS
violated IRM § 4565.21 because it developed its criminal case under the guise of a
civil investigation, by failing to turn the investigation over to the CID sooner than it
did. Id. at 538-40. The Court acknowledged that Caceres left open the possibility that a
federal court may enforce the Manual's provisions when compliance with it is man-
dated by the Constitution or federal law and thus determined that IRM § 4565.21
safeguards individual rights. Id.
"' United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Grunewald, 987 F. 2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993)).
'6' Id. at 541. (quoting United States v. Home, 714 F.2d 206, 207 (1st Cir. 1988)
(per curium)); accord United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1970)); see
United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 451-52 n.9 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1070 (1999); United States v. Grunewald, 987 F.2d 531, 534 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1993).
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conducting a criminal investigation under the guise of a civil
audit, impacts taxpayers' constitutional rights.
Specifically, if a revenue agent acts unreasonably by con-
ducting a criminal investigation under the auspice of a civil
audit, the impact on a taxpayer's Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights is three-fold. First, IRM Section 4565.21 protects a tax-
payer from unreasonable search and seizure if consent by a tax-
payer to search a taxpayer's documents is fraudulently induced.
Second, Section 4565.21 protects a taxpayer from self-
incrimination if an IRS agent induces a taxpayer into providing
documents or records, which could later incriminate him.
Third, IRM Section 4565.21 is designed to protect an individ-
ual's liberty from deceit, trickery, or coercion into providing
documents for a criminal investigation, which the taxpayer be-
lieves is merely a routine audit. As such, the better view is that
IRM Section 4565.21 safeguards these constitutional rights.
1. Protection against unreasonable search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment
IRM Section 4565.21 is designed to protect a taxpayer from
unreasonable search and seizure. The Fourth Amendment pro-
tects "[tihe right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Its privilege extends equally to taxpayers. The
Fourth Amendment not only prohibits searches accomplished
by force or by illegal threat amounting to coercion," but also to
those accomplished by "stealth, masquerade, or deceit."t
Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles thereby pro-
hibit IRS agents from obtaining information from individuals
when consent is involuntarily induced by fraud, trickery or de-
ceit.1t Thus, where the revenue agent misrepresents that in-
6'U.S. CoNSr. amend. IV.
'6 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("It is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property .. ")-
' United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Prud-
den, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v.
Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1959); KOSTELANETz, supra note 1, at 132; Saltzman,
supra note 8, 1 13.09 [4].
'" Id. It is a well-established rule that a consent search is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment if the consent was induced by deceit, trickery or misrepresenta-
tion of the IRS revenue agent. See United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir.
AMANDA A. COCHRAN
formation will be used for civil, not criminal, purposes, the tax-
payer's consent to an examination or search is violative of these
Fourth Amendment rights.
While an IRS agent can lawfully obtain records from a tax-
payer with the taxpayer's consent, consent is not free and volun-
tary if the IRS agent deceives or tricks the taxpayer. This
trickery or deceit can take the form of a revenue agent obtain-
ing evidence for use in a criminal tax prosecution during a pur-
ported civil audit.1a Furthermore, a taxpayer's consent to
obtain or search through his or her records is not free and vol-
untary if the taxpayer lacked knowledge of the true purpose for
which evidence was sought.' Fourth Amendment search and
seizure principles thereby prohibit IRS agents from obtaining
information from taxpayers when an IRS agent induces involun-
tary consent from the taxpayer. Consequently, IRS regulations
that prohibit an IRS agent from conducting a criminal investiga-
tion under the guise of a civil audit protect these Fourth
Amendment rights.
2. Protection against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment
IRM Section 4565.21 also protects a taxpayer against self-
incrimination. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o per-
son ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.''167 The Fifth Amendment protects an individual
from compelled production of oral testimony as well as his or
1999); United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S.
1070 (1999); Twee4 550 F.2d at 299; United States v. Rothstein, 530 F.2d 1275 (5th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S.
918 (1972); United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 943 (1970); Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021; Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408.
'" See Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (noting that "voluntary
consent" may constitute a waiver of the person's constitutional rights under the
Fourth Amendment); Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Iowa
1980) (obtaining records from a taxpayer, although obtained with taxpayer's consent,
was not free and voluntary since the taxpayer lacked knowledge that the true purpose
of the investigation was criminal rather than civil); SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 13.09[4]
(stating that the IRS attempts tojustify extraction of this information by claiming that
the taxpayer had voluntarily consented, thus waiving his constitutional rights).
See Vander Linden, 502 F. Supp. 693 (holding that records obtained from the
taxpayer, although obtained with his consent, were not freely and voluntarily ob-
tained since the taxpayer lacked knowledge that the true purpose of the investigation
was criminal rather than civil).
,67 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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her personal papers and effects.trs This Amendment thereby
prohibits a revenue agent not only from compelling oral testi-
mony from a taxpayer, but also from inducing a taxpayer to
provide documents or records that could later incriminate the
taxpayer. IRS regulations that prohibit an IRS agent from mas-
querading the true purpose for which the IRS agent seeks in-
formation protect these Fifth Amendment rights.
If an IRS agent beguiles a taxpayer into providing either
oral or written information, which the taxpayer might not have
provided had he or she been aware of a forthcoming criminal
inquiry," 9 the agent extracts information which compels a tax-
payer to become a witness against himself in a criminal case."'
The routine civil audit may be viewed as an invitation to obtain
confessions of guilt from known or suspected delinquent tax-
payers. By mandating that a revenue agent turn the case over to
the CID upon a "firm indication of fraud," IRS regulations pre-
sumably safeguard these rights. It would be a flagrant disregard
of a taxpayer's Fifth Amendment rights if an IRS agent deliber-
ately deceived or lulled the taxpayer into incriminating himself
during an audit when activities of an obviously criminal nature
were under investigation. 7' Consequently, IRS regulations,
which prohibit an IRS agent from conducting a criminal inves-
tigation under the guise of a civil audit, protect these Fifth
Amendment rights.
's See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (recognizing that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects an individual from com-
pelled production of his personal papers and effects, as well as compelled oral testi-
mony).
'6 See United States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that after
the government obtains possession of such information with his consent, it is too late
to claim constitutional immunity); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971)
(expressing no doubt that the government can use information legitimately obtained
during a civil audit in the prosecution of a criminal case).
170 U.S. CONs-r. amend. V; see United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir.
1999) (finding a consensual search unreasonable under the Fifth Amendment if con-
sent was induced by fraud, deceit, trickery or misrepresentation); United States v. Pe-
ters, 153 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999); Ponder 444
F.2d 819 (stating that the Fifth Amendment protects against compulsion and involun-
tary acts); Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that a tax-
payer can successfully resist the production of records on Fifth Amendment grounds
when the investigation has become an inquiry with dominant criminal overtones even
though the records had previously been examined by the government).
171 Peters, 153 F.3d at 452 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Grunewald, 987 F.2d 531,
534 (8th Cir. 1993).
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3. Protection of individual liberties under the Due Process Clause
Finally, IRM Section 4565.21 safeguards a taxpayer's liber-
ties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The Fifth Amendment states that "[n] o person shall be.
. .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .. ,,,72 This constitutional clause protects an individual's
substantive rights, including fundamental liberty and privacy in-
terests, ' 7s as well as procedural due process. 4 IRM Section
4565.21 safeguards these interests. Specifically, the provision
prevents an IRS agent from infringing on a taxpayer's funda-
mental rights by conducting a criminal investigation under the
pretense of a civil audit. Furthermore, the provision safeguards
a taxpayer's procedural due process rights by preventing IRS
agents from acting arbitrarily or unfairly.
An agent's misrepresentation or deliberate concealment of
the nature of the inquiry, in order to obtain access to the private
premises of a taxpayer and his or her books, records, and oral
statements, infringes on a taxpayer's liberty interest. "Liberty"
has been assumed to include nearly every interest of signifi-
cance to an individual, including the right of privacy and secu-
rity.175 This provision protects a taxpayer from deceit or from
being tricked into providing documents for a criminal investiga-
tion, which the taxpayer believes is merely a routine audit.
70
Moreover, it protects the taxpayer against unfair treatment. It
would be an outrageous disregard of a taxpayer's individual
rights if an agent deliberately deceived a taxpayer into incrimi-
nating himself during an audit when a criminal investigation
was underway.'"
m U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing that although the
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy, the Court has long since
believed that "a right of personal privacy or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy does exist under the Constitution"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (recognizing that a right of privacy is protected by the Bill of Rights or its pe-
numbras).
', See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 596 (1988) (stating that the Fifth
Amendment safeguards procedural due process); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
" See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLUVAN,
CONSTITONAL LAW 615-616 (13th ed. 1997).
76 United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977).
'77McKe, 192 F.3d at 541; Twee4 550 F.2d at 299.
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The Due Process Clause also guarantees systematic justice.78
It embodies a conunitment to procedural regularity and legiti-
macy of government conduct, '" holding the government to a
standard of procedural correctness. Similarly, IRM Section
4565.21 guarantees fair process by ensuring uniform conduct by
all IRS agents.lso Due process requires the IRS to follow its an-
nounced procedures, and embodies the objective of uniform
conduct by all IRS agents."" It prohibits an IRS agent from act-
ing arbitrarily and unfairly as he or she wishes. If agents could
violate a self-imposed rule of conduct without sanctions, the end
result would be terrifying. Failure to enforce these rules would
erode citizens' faith in the even-handed administration of jus-
tice.
IV. HEAVY BURDEN FOR TAXPAYERS TO DEMONSTRATE IRS
VIOLATION OF ITS MANUAL
Since IRM Section 4565.21 safeguards taxpayers' Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights, a taxpayer may challenge a tax
conviction based on the IRS's alleged noncompliance with its
procedures.12 Based on the current state of the law, however, it
is difficult, if not impossible, for a taxpayer to litigiously enforce
his or her constitutional rights against the IRS. Although IRM
provisions expressly forbid a revenue agent from conducting a
civil audit after developing a "firm indication of fraud,""*3
whether revenue agents truly adhere to this provision is ques-
tionable18e Numerous cases alleging that IRS civil agents have
conducted criminal investigations under the guise of civil inves-
tigations have been filed.' Courts, however, rarely find that
IRS agents violate provisions in their Manual.'6




' SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 1 3.04[b].
.. United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1970).
2 IRM § 4565.21 (1999).
18 id.
'" See United States v. Gaceres, 440 U.S. 741, 761 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting concern about the IRS's failure to detect or disapprove violations of its own
internal rules and citing evidence that no dismissals or demotions had occurred fol-
lowing an internal audit which had revealed thirty-five to forty instances of improper
conduct).
See cases cited supra note 91.
"= One of the sole cases where an IRS agent was found to have violated Section
4565.21 of the Manual was in United States v. Twe, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977).
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This section begins by discussing the different approaches
employed by the circuits to determine whether an IRS agent has
conducted a criminal investigation under the guise of a civil
audit. The section concludes that such tests are difficult to em-
ploy and are biased in favor of the IRS. Consequently, taxpayers
bear a heavy burden in demonstrating that IRS agents infringed
on their constitutional rights.
A. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES EMPLOYED BY THE CIRCUITS
While courts have generally decided that the "firm indica-
tions of fraud" rule, as set forth in IRM Section 4565.21, is a
good benchmark for determining whether the IRS has con-
ducted a criminal investigation under the guise of a civil audit,"7
the circuits have used various tests to determine whether an IRS
agent has violated this rule. In Grunewald v. United States,"' the
Eighth Circuit held that a taxpayer may prove that an IRS agent
conducted a criminal investigation under the guise of a civil
audit if the taxpayer establishes that: first, the IRS had a "firm
indication of fraud" by the taxpayer; second, there is clear and
convincing evidence that the IRS "affirmatively and intention-
ally" misled the taxpayer; and third, the IRS's conduct resulted
in prejudice to the taxpayer's constitutional rights. 8 9
Other courts have developed constitutional tests closely re-
sembling the "three Grunewald factors."'90  For example, the
'87 See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1070 (1999); United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 851 (8th Cir. 1998)
(requiring a defendant seeking to suppress evidence to show that the IRS continued
with civil audit after it developed firm indication of fraud), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1050
(1999); United States v. Grunewald, 987 F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993); Groder v.
United States, 816 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that continuation of fraud is
relevant to issue of whether agency conducted investigation in good faith).
'" 987 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1993).
189 Grunewal, 987 F.2d at 534 (stressing the essence of its approach was the pres-
ence of affirmative and intentional misleading by the IRS); Wadena, 152 F.3d at 851
(citing the "three Grunewald factors").
188 See United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that a tax-
payer may seek to suppress evidence if he establishes by clear and convincing evi-
dence that: first, the IRS agent made affirmative misrepresentations in the course of
the investigation; and second, that because of those misrepresentations, the taxpayer
disclosed incriminating evidence to the prejudice of his constitutional rights); Peters,
153 F.3d at 452 ("Rather than articulating 'firm indication of fraud' as independent
from a showing that the IRS affirmatively and intentionally misled the defendant, the
"firm indications" rule is best utilized as a tool for assessing whether the IRS has af-
firmatively misrepresented the nature of its investigation under the guise of a civil
audit."). The Peters court noted that its approach was not a doctrinal departure from
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McKee court stated that a taxpayer may seek to suppress evi-
dence if the taxpayer establishes by clear and convincing evi-
dence that: first, the IRS agent made affirmative
misrepresentations in the course of the investigation; and sec-
ond, that because of those misrepresentations, the taxpayer dis-
closed incriminating evidence to the prejudice of the taxpayer's
constitutional rights.19' Any differences in the tests employed by
the circuits, however, appear to be of form rather than of sub-
stance.192
B. THE TEST FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A REVENUE AGENT HAS
VIOLATED IRM SECTION 4565.21 IS DIFFICULT TO APPLY AND IS
BIASED IN FAVOR OF THE IRS
Courts have devised several different incarnations of the
constitutional tests set forth by Grunewald and McKee-'9 For sim-
plicity purposes, the general test for determining whether a
revenue agent has conducted a criminal investigation under the
guise of a civil audit' can be condensed as follows: The tax-
payer must produce clear and convincing evidence that the IRS
agent affirmatively misrepresented that the tax investigation was
routine after having developed a "firm indication of fraud," and
that because of such affirmations, the taxpayer disclosed evi-
dence to the IRS agent against his or her constitutional rights.'
the approach set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Grunewald and Wadena, stating that in
Grunewad, the Eighth Circuit stressed that the essence of its approach was the pres-
ence of affirmative and intentional misleading by the IRS. Peters, 153 F.3d at 452. See
also United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1033 (5th Cir. 1970):
The mere failure of a revenue agent... to warn the taxpayer that the investigation may
result in criminal charges, absent any acts by the agent which materially misrepresent the
nature of the inquiry, does not constitute fraud, deceit and trickery. Therefore, the record
here must disclose some affirmative representation to establish the existence of fraud, and
this showing must be dear and convincing.
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
"' McKee, 192 F.3d at 542.
192Id. In general, courts require the taxpayer to produce clear and convincing evi-
dence that the agents affirmatively misled him as to the true nature of their investiga-
tion. See id.; Peters, 153 F.3d at 451-453; Wadena, 152 F.3d at 851; Grunewald, 987 F.2d
at 534.
1 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
"4 IRM § 4565.21 (1999).
"s See, e.g., McKee, 192 F.3d at 542; United States v. Nuth, 605 F.2d 229, 234 (6th
Cir. 1979).
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This test, however, is inadequate for several reasons. First,
the "firm indication of fraud" standard is inherently vague,"'0
and depends in large part on the good faith and professional
judgment of the revenue agents conducting the investigation.1 7
Second, the "affirmative misrepresentation" requirement is dif-
ficult to prove, and courts rarely find an affirmative misrepre-
sentation on the part of the IRS agent.'98 Furthermore, the
absence of a duty to warn a taxpayer of a potential ensuing
criminal investigation is problematic.'9 Finally, this test is bi-
ased in favor of the IRS. Given the tremendous amount of def-
erence that IRS agents have to carry out their official duties,
courts are unwilling to hold that an IRS agent has abused his or
her discretion in continuing an investigation.!0 0 Taxpayers
therefore bear a tremendous burden in proving that an agent
has violated the Manual and infringed on their constitutional
rights.
1. "Firm indication offraud" standard is vague
IRM Section 4565.21 mandates that a revenue agent sus-
pend his or her audit upon discovering a "firm indication of
fraud," and refer the case to the CID.20 Courts, like the IRS,
have adopted this "firm indication of fraud" standard as a
benchmark for determining whether an IRS agent has con-
ducted a criminal investigation under the guise of a civil audit.
2 02
Some courts, like Grunewald,2" 3 have set forth a "firm indication
of fraud" test as a separate factor, aside from the "affirmative
misrepresentation" requirement, to determine whether the
agent intentionally misled the taxpayer. ° Other courts use the
"firm indications" rule as a tool for assessing whether the IRS
'z' See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.
"6 See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.
. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.
' See discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
See discussion infra Section IV.B.4.
20' IRM § 4565.21 (1999).
"* See, e.g., United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998) (requiring a de-
fendant seeking to suppress evidence to show that the IRS continued with civil audit
after it developed firm indication of fraud), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1050 (1999); Groder
v. United State, 816 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that continuation of fraud
is relevant to issue of whether agency conducted investigation in good faith).
203 United States v. Grunewald, 987 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1993).
' Id. at 534; Wadena, 152 F.3d at 851; United States v. Serlin 707, F.2d 953, 957
(7th Cir. 1983).
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agent committed an affirmative misrepresentation as to the na-
ture of the agent's investigation.2 Nonetheless, whether the
"firm indication of fraud" standard is an independent factor or
combined with the "affirmative misrepresentation" require-
ment, the criterion is problematic for the following reasons.
Foremost, the courts' attempt to distinguish a "firm indica-
tion of fraud" from a "first indication of fraud", has proven to be
unsuccessful."2 7 A "first indication of fraud" can be described as
a mere suspicion of fraud.28 On the contrary, a "firm indication
of fraud" confirms, supports and adds to the initial suspicion of
fraud.2° IRS regulations instruct its revenue agents to suspend
their civil activities when they detect the latter,2 '0 However,
where the distinction lies between "first" and "firm" is unclear.
IRS regulations instruct a revenue agent to "perfect" any
"first indication of fraud" to ensure that such indication is sub-
stantial, before referring the case to the CID. 21 1 Indeed, IRS ex-
aminers are legally permitted to ask the taxpayer to explain and
support discrepancies, which are the basis of the examiner's
suspicions of fraud, and ask for any information that will resolve
the question of the taxpayer's intent.212  However, this proce-
dure is problematic because in doing so, the revenue agent ex-
amines the taxpayers' books and records, which may later
become unavailable to the IRS when the taxpayer knows of the
criminal nature of the investigation.
In the process of perfecting indications of fraud, a revenue
agent may gather evidence for use in a criminal case without giv-
ing notice to the taxpayer that what began as an ordinary ex-
2" United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 1999) (using the "firm indi-
cation of fraud" standard as a tool to assess whether the IRS agent made an affirma-
tive misrepresentation to the constitutional detriment of the taxpayer); United States
v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (using the "firm indication of fraud" rule
"as a tool for assessing whether the IRS has affirmatively misrepresented the nature of
its investigation under the guise of a civil audit" rather than as an independent stan-
dard), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999).
Grunewald, 987 F.2d at 534 (noting that these two formulations do not doctri-
nally depart).
'Id. at 455; Wadena, 152 F.3d at 851.
Id.; Peters, 153 F.3d at 455.
Id. (quoting IRM § 4565.21).
2'0 RM § 4565.21 (1999) (instructing revenue agents to be alert to fraud).
211 Peters, 153 F.3d at 455 (quoting SALTMAN, supra note 8, 1 12.03(1] [a]).
112 Id. at 445. Indeed, this development is necessary because the CID must have
sufficient information from which to assess the potential of a criminal case.
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amination has changed focus. 23  The agent must discontinue
the investigation at "the earliest opportunity" and do so without
disclosing the reason for suspending the audit to the taxpayer.
2 14
Yet, the "earliest opportunity" does not mean "immediately.21"
The reality is that the referring revenue agent may have ob-
tained evidence useful to and perhaps critical in a criminal in-
vestigation, such as extracts or copies of the taxpayer's records,
even before the special agent has appeared.2 6 Any attempt to
separate a "firm indication of fraud" from a "first indication of
fraud" thus seems obscure.
The vagueness of the "firm indication of fraud" test is fur-
ther exemplified by the courts' failure to devise a meaningful
set of factors to determine exactly when there is a firm indication
of the fraud.21 7 Unable to express the "firm indication of fraud"
211
standard in a set of absolute criteria, courts have used several
considerations to guide themselves in these open waters.1 9 Case
law suggests that a revenue agent has developed a "firm indica-
tion of fraud" upon occurrence of any of the following circum-
stances: the taxpayer has engaged in a consistent pattern of
substantial underreporting income or overstating deductions,
such that intent can be inferred;20 CID personnel participates in
a civil audit prior to completion of a criminal referral; 221 the
revenue agent continues audit activities after beginning prepa-
ration of the fraud referral report;222 or the revenue agent has
assessed the taxpayer's intent as willful or intentional. These
" SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 12.0311].
214 United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1070 (1999).
215
216 SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 12.0311].
217 Peters, 153 F.3d at 453 (noting the "firm indications of fraud" rule is not ex-
pressed in a set of absolute criteria, rather the facts and circumstances of each case
must be assessed in their own light).
218 id.
219 Peters, 153 F.3d at 453.
United States v. Grunewald, 987 F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993).
221 Peters, 153 F.3d at 445; United States v. Caldwell, 820 F.2d 1395, 1399 n.4 (5th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 17 (9th Cir. 1973).
2" Peters, 153 F.3d at 445; United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 31 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1050 (1999).
'2 See Peters, 153 F.3d at 445 (recognizing that assessment of the taxpayer's intent is
the most critical element in a revenue agent's determination of whether "firm indica-
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factors, however, burden the taxpayer to establish an affirmative
misrepresentation on behalf of the revenue agent. As later dis-
cussed, this is problematic because seldom is an affirmative mis-
representation clear. 4 More often, taxpayers encounter the
indistinct situation where an IRS agent leads a taxpayer to be-
lieve that the investigation pertains to a civil audit, or where the
IRS revenue agent is silent.
Finally, the "firm indications of fraud" standard is a difficult
standard for federal courts to apply because it depends in large
part on the good faith and judgment of the revenue agents
conducting the investigation.26 IRS regulations require the
revenue agent to exercise extraordinary delicate judgments as
to when an investigation should be discontinued.- The agent
must disco'ntinue the investigation at the exact point that the
agent detects enough evidence to support fraud. But the di-
lemma is clear. This test does not protect taxpayers from
overzealous IRS agents, and may be entirely inadequate to pro-
tect against agent misconduct during the "passion of the
hunt."
2. "Affirmative misrepresentation" by IRS agent is difficult to establish
To determine whether an agent violates IRM Section
4565.21, the taxpayer must also prove that the revenue agent
made an "affirmative misrepresentation" that the investigation
was a routine civil audit, when in fact, the investigation sought
evidence for a criminal prosecution.2 This central "affirmative
tions of fraud" exist in any particular case); Groder v. United States, 816 F.2d 139,
143-144 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that the taxpayer's intent to evade taxes differentiates
a criminal violation from a civil case).
2' See discussion infra Section W.B.2.
See discussion infra Section V.B.2.
22 Peters, 153 F.3d at 452-53.
2 See United States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d 495, 498-99 (1st Cir. 1988); United States
v. Caldwell, 820 F.2d 1395, 1402 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that the criminal referral de-
cision is discretionary in nature and is not governed by any absolute criteria).
2' See IRM § 4565.21 (1999).
22 Budner, supra note 3, at 801; seediscussion infra Section V.B.
2' See, e.g., United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that if the
revenue agent continues the civil audit even after she has discovered "firm indications
of fraud," then the agent is in fact, making affirmative representations to the constitu-
tional detriment of the taxpayer because he or she is gathering criminal evidence
against the taxpayer under the guise of a civil proceeding); United States v. Peters,
153 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denieA, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999); United States v.
Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 851 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S 1050 (1999); United
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misrepresentation" component, however, is difficult to establish.
Courts rarely find an affirmative misrepresentation unless there
is a "clear showing that the taxpayer was tricked or deceived."23'
With the exception of the Fifth Circuit case, United States v.
Twee 232 seldom is an affirmative misrepresentation on the part
of an IRS agent altogether clear.23
3
In Twee, the taxpayer moved to suppress evidence obtained
by the IRS during the course of a routine civil audit, from the
ensuing criminal prosecution for tax evasion.2 4  The taxpayer
argued that during the course of the civil audit, his accountant
asked the IRS agent whether the special agent was involved to
determine whether the nature of the tax examination was
criminal or civil.25  The agent, however, denied criminal in-
volvement without disclosing that the audit was conducted at
the specific request of the criminal department.2
36
Applying the Fifth Circuit's rule that consent is ineffective
under the Fourth Amendment if induced by an IRS agent's de-
237ceit, trickery or misrepresentation, the court held that the
agent's failure to tell the taxpayer of the "obvious criminal na-
ture of this investigation was a sneaky, deliberate deception by
the agent ... ,,23 In these circumstances, "the misrepresenta-
tion was both intentionally misleading and material," thereby vi-
tiating the taxpayer's consent to inspect his documents. 239
States v. Grunewald, 987 F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Nuth, 605
F.2d 229, 234 (6th Cir. 1979) (an affirmative misrepresentation by an IRS agent that
the investigation is routine when it is, in fact, a criminal investigation, generally re-
quires suppression of evidence).
2' McKee, 192 F.3d at 542 (suppressing evidence only upon a "clear showing that
the taxpayer was tricked or deceived" (citing United States v. Nuth, 605 F.2d 229, 234
(6th Cir. 1979))); see also United States v. Allen, 522 F.2d 1229, 1233 (6th Cir. 1975)
("In the absence of a clear showing that the taxpayer has been tricked or deceived by
the government agents into providing incriminating information, the documents and
statements obtained by the Internal Revenue agents are admissible.").
212 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977).
233 id.
234 ITd.
2" Id. at 298. Each of the IRS revenue agents made intentional misrepresentations
to procure information the taxpayers otherwise would not have produced. Id.
mId. The investigation was conducted at the request of the Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section of the Department ofJustice, which is only involved in criminal
investigations. Id.
W See United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1033 (5th Cir. 1970) (reversing
suppression order), cert. denied 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
Tweel, 550 F.2d at 299.
239 idi
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During oral argument, counsel for the Government stated that
the procedures employed by the IRS agent were "routine." 0 In-
terestingly, the court noted that "[i]f that is the case we hope
our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated
and if this is the 'routine' it should be corrected immediately."24'
Few cases demonstrate an affirmative misrepresentation by
an IRS agent as clearly as TweeL Most cases do not implicate a
criminal law enforcement agency actually requesting that the
IRS conduct a civil audit as part of an ongoing criminal investi-
gation.2  A more likely scenario is where an IRS agent silently
changes focus of the investigation into one that is criminal in
nature, and leads the taxpayer to believe that the purpose of the
investigation continues to be one that is civil. 2  As one vulner-
able taxpayer claimed, "I was completely convinced that no
criminal investigation would ensue, because the wording in [the
letters from the revenue agent] gave me the impression that the
[a] gent was finally closing the case." 244
While an affirmative misrepresentation as to the nature of
an investigation is strong evidence of coercion, courts have
generally considered silence to be fraudulent only if there is
clear and convincing evidence that the silence was intentionally
misleading.246 Realistically, courts have simply not found an IRS
240 Id. at 300 n.9.
24 Id. at 300 ("Our revenue system is based on the good faith of the taxpayers and
the taxpayers should be able to expect the same from the government in its enforce-
ment and collection activities.").
22 See United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 457 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that "un-
like Twee, this was not a case in which a criminal law enforcement agency requested
that the IRS conduct a civil audit as part of an ongoing investigation"), certL denied,
525 U.S. 1070 (1999).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400
U.S. 831 (1970); United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 943 (1970).
United States v. Marra, 481 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (6th Cir. 1973).
245 United States v. Mapp, 561 F.2d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Leh-
man, 468 F.2d 93, 105 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 (1972).
20' Peters, 153 F.3d at 451 ("Simple failure to inform defendant that he was the sub-
ject of the investigation, or that the investigation was criminal in nature, does not
amount to affirmative deceit unless defendant inquired about the nature of the inves-
tigation and the agents' failure to respond was intended to mislead." (citing United
States v. Serlin, 707 F.2d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1983))); Twee 550 F.2d at 299 ("Silence
can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where
an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading." (citing Prudden, 424
F.2d at 1032))); United States v. Meier, 607 F.2d 215, 217 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding
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agent's silence to be intentionally misleading. Cases like this are
not in short supply.
In United States v. Prudden,247 the revenue agent referred the
taxpayer's case to the CID upon finding a "firm indication of
fraud."248 However, the revenue agent continued his examina-
tion and requested further information from the taxpayer.24 9 In
several instances, the taxpayer refused to give the agent docu-
ments that he felt were outside the scope of the examination.2 '0
However, the revenue agent informed the taxpayer that the IRS
would continue to request further information until the tax-
payer produced the records.2 1 A succeeding revenue agent
thereafter appeared with a special agent of the CID, who identi-
fied himself as such. z2 The two agents told the defendant they
were examining his returns, but never told him that a criminal
investigation was in progress. The district court suppressed all
evidence obtained during the referral, but the Fifth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the revenue agent did not affirmatively mis-
represent the nature of the examination to thetaxpayer. 254
Similarly, United States v. Tonahil[5 involved a referral to the
CID from the Examination Division during the course of a civil
audit.25 Following the appearance of a special agent, the tax-
payer asked both the revenue agent and the special agent why
the investigation was so lengthy, and whether fraud was in-
volved. 7 The agents stated that they were attempting to recon-
cile large discrepancies, and did not advise the defendant about
whether fraud was involved. 8 After the taxpayer was aware of
the formal criminal prosecution, he sought to suppress all evi-
that the taxpayer failed to present clear and convincing evidence that agent's silence
was intended to mislead him), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980).
247 Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
211 ri at 1022-23.
21 d. at 1023.
2'0 Id. at 1024.
2" Id. (taxpayer told the revenue agent that the revenue agent was simply on a fish-
ing expedition-trying only to gather facts that would support the agent's precon-
ceived conclusions).
22 Id. at 1024-25.
2 Id. at 1035.
2" 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).




2001] CMViL TAX INQUIRIES AD CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
dence obtained by the IRS agent during the purported civil
audit, from the ensuing criminal prosecution. The trial court
granted the motion to suppress the evidence.29 However, the
Fifth Circuit, in reliance upon Prudden, reversed the granting of
the motion to suppress.260
While recognizing that evidence obtained during a civil
audit upon an affirmative misrepresentation by an IRS agent
might be suppressed in a subsequent criminal trial, both Prud-
den and Tonahill recognize that failure by the IRS revenue agent
to advise the taxpayer that a criminal investigation is underway
does not amount to such conduct.2 6' Indeed, few courts have ac-
tually found an affirmative misrepresentation on the part of the
IRS agent.2 2 As one court noted:
[The taxpayers did] not present clear and convincing evidence that the
IRS affirmatively and intentionally misled the defendants by conducting
the civil audit. ., with the express purpose of obtaining records for the
criminal investigation. Indeed [taxpayers] point to nothing more than
knowledge by the [revenue agent] that [the CID special agent] was
conducting a criminal investigation. Neither [taxpayers] have estab-
lished the second Grunewald factor.2
The court stated that proof of knowledge by the civil audi-
tor that a criminal investigation had commenced was insuffi-
cient to prove an affirmative misrepresentation on behalf of the
IRS agent. What, then, does the taxpayer need to prove? Each
of these cases illustrates that proving an affirmative misrepre-
sentation by the IRS agent is difficult, if not nearly impossible.
Furthermore, even if district courts do find some form of af-
firmative act or misrepresentation, most cases are overturned on
appeal.' 64 Twee4 the archetypal case of an "affirmative act" by a
259 Id.
26 Id. at 1044-45.
2' 1d.; United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
831 (1970).
252 United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 298-99 (5th Cir. 1977).
20 United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 852 (8th Cir. 1998). cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1050 (1999).
See, e.g., Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (reversing suppression of evidence obtained
during the course of the audit referral); Tonahil4 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970) (re-
versing granting of motion to suppress evidence gathered during the course of civil
audit), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
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revenue agent,26 is a rarity because seldom will the CID or any
other criminal law enforcement agency explicitly request the
Examination Division to further its investigation. What is more,
Tweel is over thirty years old.26  The lack of judicial recognition
of this requirement renders it effectively useless.
3. Absence of duty to warn taxpayer of a potential ensuing criminal
investigation is problematic
Underlying the vagueness of the affirmative misrepresenta-
tion requirement is the inherent problem that the IRS revenue
agent need not warn taxpayers that the civil audit may evolve into
a criminal investigation. 67 Unlike a special agent, a revenue
agent need not disclose to the taxpayer at the onset of the inves-
tigation, that the investigation may result in a criminal charge. 9
Revenue agents also do not have a duty to apprise a taxpayer
that the taxpayer need not furnish requested information,2  and
that if the taxpayer does furnish such information, it may be
used against him in criminal proceedings.2 7 ' This is perhaps the
6 Tweel, 550 F.2d 297.
266id!
267 United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1070 (1999); United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 851-52 (8th Cir. 1998) ("The
mere failure of an IRS agent to inform a defendant that information developed in an
audit may result in a further criminal investigation does not indicate affirmative and
intentional deceit by the IRS."); United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 298 (5th Cir.
1977) (holding that the mere failure of a revenue agent "to warn the taxpayer that
the investigation may result in criminal charges, absent any acts by the agent which
materially misrepresent the nature of the inquiry, do not constitute fraud, deceit or
trickery." (quoting P-udden, 424 F.2d at 1033)).
26 United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1977). The Tweel court
noted that a special agent must advise the taxpayer before the interview, of the follow-
ing:
As a special agent, one of my functions is to investigate the possibility of criminal violations
of the Internal Revenue Laws, and related offenses. In connection with my investigation of
your tax liability (or other matter) I would like to ask you some questions, However, first I
advise you that under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States I can-
not compel you to answer any questions or submit any information if such answers or in-
formation might ten to incriminate you in any way. I also advise you that anything which
you say and any information which you submit may be used against you in any criminal
proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise you further that you may, if you wish, seek
the assistance of an attorney before responding. Do you understand.
Id. at 300 n.3.
26
' Peters, 153 F.3d at 447.
570 United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1964).
27 The view that Miranda requirements do not apply to non-custodial questioning
by IRS agents has been adopted by every Court of Appeals which has passed on this
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most troublesome aspect of the civil audit. Taxpayers may not
know that information turned over during the course of a civil
audit may be used against them in a criminal proceeding."
This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the
revenue agent has no duty to disclose to the taxpayer when the
focus of the investigation has changed in status from civil to
criminal,7 nor that the agent has referred the case to the
CID.27 4 The IRS maintains that the mere fact that a taxpayer's
returns are under audit should give the taxpayer "sufficient no-
question and by a majority of the District Courts which have done so. These courts
have distinguished examinations introduced by misrepresentation and deceit, and
those examinations that commence openly and correctly as routine audits but which
later develop into criminal cases. See United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding that simple failure to inform defendant that he was the subject of the
investigation, or that the investigation was criminal in nature, does not amount to af-
firmative deceit unless defendant inquired about the nature of the investigation and
the agents' failure to respond was intended to mislead), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1070
(1999); United States v. Lehman, 468 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
967 (1972); United States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971); Prudden, 424 F.2d
1021; United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that the re-
quirement of a warning of right to counsel, necessary to prevent compulsion where
the person questioned is in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way, does not extend to all other instances of government questioning,
and "application of the full Miranda requirements to non-custodial questioning con-
ducted during the initial stages of tax inquiry or other routing government inquiry,
would impede an already difficult administrative task and seriously hinder the effi-
ciency with which that task is carried out."); United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408,
415 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding that a routine tax investigation openly commenced as
such lacks stealth or deceit because the ordinary taxpayer knows that there is inher-
ent in it a warning that the government's agents will "pursue evidence of misreport-
ing without regard to the shadowy line between avoidance and evasion, mistake and
willful omission"), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959); Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d
926, 931 (4th Cir. 1955) ("[I]t is not essential to the admissibility of statements se-
cured by officers of the law from a defendant that he should be first warned that the
information might be used against him in a criminal case, provided that it was volun-
tarily and understandingly given."); Hanson v. United States, 186 F.2d 61 (8th Cir.
1950). Note that the special agent must give Miranda warnings at the inception of the
IRS's first contact with him after the revenue agent transfers the case to him. United
States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
SALTzMAN, supra note 8, j 2.03[2] [b]; see United States v. Meier, 607 F.2d 215
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980); United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d
941 (7th Cir. 1964).
United States v. Marra, 481 F.2d 1196, 1203 (6th Cir. 1973) ("[Ilt is unrealistic
to suggest that the government could or should keep a taxpayer advised as to the di-
rection in which its necessarily fluctuating investigations lead." (quoting United States
v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408, 414-15 (2d Cir. 1959))).
74 HARRY GRAHAm BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION 5.03[3] [c] (1983) (stating that
there is no need to warn taxpayer, or any of the taxpayer's representatives, that the
revenue agent intends to submit his findings to the CID to determine whether to con-
tinue the investigation).
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tice of the possibility of criminal prosecution regardless of
whether the agents contemplate civil or criminal action ....
In United States v. Nuth,26 the taxpayer alleged that the IRS
agent violated IRM Section 4565.21 by tricking the taxpayer into
providing information that he would not have provided if he
had known that a future investigation was pending. 7 The court
found, however, that the taxpayer had not been effectively
tricked or deceived by the IRS agent as to the criminal nature of
the tax investigation, because the taxpayer was an attorney and a
businessman who must have been aware of the "potential crimi-
nal aspects" of the civil audit 7 8 The court embraced the notion
that a taxpayer who cooperates with a revenue agent on the as-
sumption that the investigation is a civil audit, and cooperates
after the focus of the audit has changed, cooperates at the tax-
payer's own risk.2 9 This is true even if the taxpayer would not
have cooperated had the revenue agent advised him that a pos-
sible criminal case may evolve.
The rationale of the court's decision in Nuth and its prog-
eny reflects the assumption that every taxpayer knows or should
know that when an audit by a revenue agent begins, there is al-
ways a possibility that the investigation may end up as a criminal
case. 281 This assumption, however, is tenuous. Many taxpayers
do not know of their constitutional rights to refuse to voluntar-
ily furnish information to an IRS agent. They do not under-
stand the danger or significance of their testimony, and that
information they present in a civil audit may be used against
them in criminal proceedings.82 A taxpayer's ignorance or fail-
27 United States v. Marra, 481 F.2d 1196, 1203 (6th Cir. 1973) (quoting United
States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785, 788 (2d Cir. 1968)).
276 605 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1979).
2'n Id at 234.
278 Nuth, 605 F.2d at 234 (citing United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir.
1971)); see also United States v. Allen, 522 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that
suppression of evidence should not be granted unless there is a clear showing that the
taxpayer was tricked or deceived).




281 Id. In fact, this is inherent in the underlying IRS structure. See Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
282 SALrzmAN, supra note 8, 2.03[2) [b]; see United States v. Meier, 607 F.2d 215
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980); United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d
941, 943 (7th Cir. 1964) (stating that "subjective lack of knowledge of [the taxpayer's
constitutional] rights did not serve to vitiate the voluntary surrender of [the tax-
payer's records] and did not thereby result in a violation of his right to remain silent
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ure to know his or her constitutional rights, and to assert these
rights, should not remove these constitutional protections.'
4. Courts are hesitant to declare that an IRS agent has abused
his or her discretion
The ambiguity in the constitutional tests used by the courts
to determine whether an IRS agent has violated IRM Section
4565.21 is embittered by the courts' tremendous deference to
the judgment of the IRS and their reluctance to find that the
IRS has abused this discretion.2 In determining whether the
IRS has violated its own rules, courts have struggled to balance
the judicial micro-management of the inner functioning of an
administrative agency and the duty to protect the constitutional
rights of taxpayers. The reality, however, is that courts are
hesitant to determine that the IRS violates these provisions. The
and to withhold his private records"); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1961)
(noting that the purpose of the right to counsel, guaranteed by the Constitution is to
.protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and
constitutional rights, and the guaranty would be nullified by a determination that an
accused's ignorant failure to claim his rights removes the protection of the Constitu-
tion").
2'Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465.
See United States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d 495, 498-499 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that
courts must give considerable weight to the IRS' own interpretation of their regula-
tions); United States v. Caldwell, 820 F.2d 1395, 1402 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting the re-
ferral decision is discretionary in nature and is not governed by any absolute
criterion); Groder v. United States, 816 F.2d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 1987) (second-
guessing a revenue agent's judgment should not become a routine chore for judges
(citing United States v. Matrs, 476 F. Supp. 1287, 1292-93 (S.D.N.Y.))); Liberty Finan-
cial Services v. United States, 778 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that since admini-
stration of revenue laws is a function which by congressional direction and by
expertise belongs to the IRS, courts hesitate second-guessing a revenue agent's judg-
ment). Even the Audit Guidelines for Examiners indicate that the referral decision is
inescapably a discretionary one. I CCH IRM (Audit) para. 961 (Manual states that
"how far to extend the examination will depend on the examiner's judgment in a
particular case," however, "[t]here can be no absolute criterion established upon
which to rely in making a decision when to suspend an investigation and refer a case
to Criminal Investigation.").
United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 453 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that on the
one side, courts face "the Scylla ofjudicial micromanagement of the inner function-
ing of an administrative agency, a peril recognized by many of the courts that have
addressed this issue"), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999); United States v. Grunewald.
987 F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993) ("If IRS agents, exercising sound discretion and
good judgment, fear suppression of evidence where no intentional, prejudicial mis-




McKee court,28 holding that the IRS did not violate their Manual
provisions, stated:
We reach this conclusion reluctantly. It is particularly troubling that al-
most all of the government's evidence against the McKees was practically
handed to the CID on a silver platter as a result of the civil investigation.
. . . Nevertheless, as this case exemplifies, the reality is that revenue
agents sometimes perform the same functions of evidence gathering as
their CID counterparts, and such evidence is often admissible at a crimi-
nal trial."
7
In hindsight, the McKee court stated that the IRS revenue
agent should have transferred the matter to the CID earlier
than it did."' The court espoused a cursory warning, encourag-
ing revenue agents to "err on the side of protecting taxpayers'
constitutional rights when they conduct their investigations.0
8 9
Nonetheless, the court's ruling was based on the fact that courts
must defer to the discretion of revenue agents to carry out their
official duties.20 This case is not an anomaly. In Groder v. United
States, the court noted that the revenue agent was inexperienced
and that "a more experienced agent would have discontinued
the investigation at an earlier stage."2 ' Nonetheless, the court
dismissed the taxpayer's claim because the taxpayer produced
no evidence of bad faith or intent to deceive on the part of the
agent.292 This type of reasoning is frightening. Both the McKee
and Groder courts acknowledged that the IRS agents erred in re-
taining the cases longer than they should have, but the courts
were apprehensive about preempting the IRS agents and limit-
ing their authority.
There is no indication that the courts are curtailing this dis-
cretion. If IRS discretion were limited, arguably there may be
fewer tax convictions and lower penalties or associated taxes col-
"6 United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 1999).
27 Id. at 544.
289 id.
2"id.
"2' Groder v. United States, 816 F.2d 139, 144-45 (4th Cir. 1986). The court noted
that "assessment of the facts by a seasoned agent may well have led to an earlier refer-
ral than occurred here." Id. Nonetheless, inexperience was different from bad faith,
and the district court found no impropriety on the part of the IRS. Id.
m id.
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lected.23 Tax-evaders may go free.m The civil Examination Di-
vision may also refer more cases to the CID for investigation.2
Nonetheless, not all cases referred to the CID are prosecuted
criminally.m Cases are individually assessed based on the
chances of collecting the taxes, and the deterrent effects that
prosecution would have on the taxpayer. 7 Moreover, the dan-
gers of affording too much discretion to IRS agents are far
greater.
The most obvious peril is the challenge that it will pose to
the system of voluntary compiance.28 Furthermore, if IRS in-
ternal operating procedures afford anything less than faithful
adherence to constitutional guarantees, courts may actually en-
courage revenue agents to violate their rules, and simultane-
ously undermine public confidence in the IRS.m Finally,
allowing constitutional infringements on unsuspecting taxpay-
ers would be the greatest pitfall of all.
V. REMEDIES AND SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
When an IRS agent violates Section 4565.21 of its Manual by
conducting a criminal investigation under the auspice of a civil
audit, the IRS infringes on a taxpayer's constitutional rights.
These constitutional transgressions require redress. This sec-
tion begins by arguing that suppression of evidence is the only
appropriate remedy if an IRS agent illegally obtains evidence in
violation of a taxpayer's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.-'2
2'3 SeeAnthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on theFourth Amendment, 58 MiN\N. L RE'.
349, 354, 416-28 (1974) (noting that restrictions on law enforcement reduce society's
ability to control crime).
2H 4 d.
2 See Groder v. United States, 816 F.2d 139, 144 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that a less
deferential approach "would encourage premature referrals of taxpayers for fraud in-
vestigations based on little more than a revenue agent's unsubstantiated hunch").
See COMSMYETAL, supra note 7, 1 4.02[3][a], P4.02[4]. Special agents do not
recommend all investigations for prosecutions. Investigations that involve flagrant
violations with high prosecution potential and deterrent impact on compliance, are
favored for prosecution. Id.
2 id.
S CoMiSKEYETAL, supra note 7, 1.03; KOSrELANETz, supra note 1, at 72.
SeeJames v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) (noting that police misconduct
would be encouraged by permitting such use of illegally obtained evidence).
3" SeeWeeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914):
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in e'idence against
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his
right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
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This section urges that greater proactive protections for taxpay-
ers are imperative to decreasing agency abuse and increasing
congressional and judicial action. In light of the potential for
IRS agent misconduct, attention of Congress and the Supreme
Court is necessary to provide for a clearer indication of when
the IRS violates its own laws, and to enforce IRS adherence to its
rules.
A. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
To preserve Fourth and Fifth Amendment liberties, courts
have generally fashioned an exclusionary rule in criminal and
administrative proceedings.:0' Under this rule, evidence ob-
tained illegally by government officials in violation of an indi-
vidual's constitutional rights and privileges is inadmissible in
criminal proceedings.302 Typically applied in the context of
criminal and administrative proceedings, the exclusionary rule
deters future unlawful governmental conduct, protects defen-
dants from the abuses of overzealous law enforcement person-
nel, and supports the ideal of judicial integrity.303 These general
exclusionary principles apply in tax prosecutions as well.3
A primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future
unlawful governmental conduct.305 Courts can best serve this
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of
the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are,
are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of cn-
deavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of
the land.
sId.
" Budner, supra note 3, at 789 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398). "Although contro-
versial, this rule arguably guards the rights of defendants from the abuses of overzeal-
ous law enforcement personnel." Id.
... See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) (declaring that the Court's
purpose is to prevent "willfully lawless activities [from being] undertaken in the name
of law enforcement"); SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 13.0915].
... Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, U. ILL. L. R. 518, 536 n.90 (1975) (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392) (hold-
ing that exclusionary rules apply to all who execute the criminal laws of the country to
obtain convictions by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions); see also
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885) (stating that the limitations of the
Fourth Amendment reach beyond state officers to the Federal Government and its
agencies).
... United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975) (relying on the exclusionary
rule's deterrent purpose in applying the exclusionary rule to unconstitutionally seized
evidence); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (characterizing the ex-
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purpose by excluding from trial any illegally obtained evi-
dence.30 6 Judicial admission of the fruits of an illegal search
would undermine the purpose of the Fourth AmendmentY'0
and implicitly condone approval of the unconstitutional con-
duct that produced the evidence. s5 Absent the exclusionary
rule, the government would be free to manipulate or deceive
without the possibility of consequences s 9 Indeed, with lax en-
forcement of internal IRS rules, agent misconduct may increase
because no person reasonably relies on rules that are ignored. "'
Furthermore, the integrity of the judicial process and of the
revenue collection scheme in general is also at stake" judicial
integrity requires that courts not become accomplices in the vio-
lation of the Constitution they are sworn to uphold.31 2 If courts
permit the IRS to obtain a federal conviction on the basis of the
fruits of an illegal search, the judiciary has condoned and given
full effect to deliberate governmental violations of the law."3
clusionary rule as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amend-
ment rights generally through its deterrent effect").
s' Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 693, 697 (S.D. Iowa, 1980).
"7 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (If private documents can
be seized and held and used in evidence against an accused citizen, "the protection of
the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be stricken from the Constitution.").
See id.; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (noting that the pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule is to protect constitutional rights of privacy).
9 See Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 766 (1979) (MarshallJ., dissenting) ("Restricting ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule to instances of bad faith would invite law enforce-
ment officials to gamble that courts would grant absolution for all but the most
egregious conduct.").
,
0Id. at 762 (MarshallJ, dissenting).
" See Budner, supra note 3, at 805-807.
512 Henry Lueders Henderson, Justice in the Eighties: The Exclusionary Rule and the
Principle ofJudicial Integrity, 65 JuDICATuRE 354, 356 (1982); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (noting that "[niothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting):
In a government of laws, existence of the government uill be imperiled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal
law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
5' Budner, supra note 3, at 806 n.155 ("If the federal court permits such evidence
[obtained by the illegal conduct of a law enforcement agent] to be used to obtain a
conviction, it places its imprimatur upon such lawlessness and thereby taints its own
747
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Competing considerations must give way to the higher 9oal of
protecting the individual taxpayer's constitutional rights. ' Fur-
thermore, other evidence may exist which could support the tax
assessment, and the government could unearth this evidence.
Courts should thereby apply the exclusionary rule in tax prose-
cutions as well,15 and suppress evidence that an IRS agent ille-
gally obtains in a civil tax audit and attempts to use in a
subsequent criminal proceeding.
B. POLICY REASONS FOR CHANGE: INADEQUACY OF IRS SELF-
REGULATION
Proactive change must also be made to decrease IRS abuse.
The Internal Revenue rules, coupled with the lack of judicial
and legislative intervention, currently grant individual revenue
agents too much latitude in making the criminal referral deci-
sion.31 6 The IRS's extremely broad authority enables an agent to
commit "abusive and arbitrary acts" at the expense of the tax-
payer's constitutional liberties. 7 The ramifications of these
transgressions are two-fold. First, these violations severely
integrity." (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 746 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting))).
", Courts have generally employed a balancing test to determine whether the likely
deterrent effect of exclusion outweighs the benefits of admitting the tainted evidence.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-54 (1974) (making explicit the balance
of interests test implicit in all Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule decisions, and
stating that weighing the potential benefits of exclusion against the potential for
harm of losing relevant evidence is required). For discussion and criticism of how
this balance of interests test has been articulated and applied, see 1 WAYNE R. LA FAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FoURTH AMENDMENT §1.5 (1996).
311 See United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Nuth, 605 F.2d 229, 234 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[Glenerally an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion by an IRS agent that the investigation is routine when in fact it is a criminal in-
vestigation requires suppression of evidence."); United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297,
300 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that evidence obtained in violation of the taxpayer's
Fourth Amendment rights, as well as any evidence derived therefrom, should be sup-
pressed); Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp 693, 696-697 (S.D. Iowa, 1980)
(suppression of evidence is the appropriate remedy when tax evidence was illegally
seized, violating taxpayer's Fourth Amendment rights.); SALTZMAN, supra note 8,
13.09[5]; Budner, supra note 3, at 811-16. But cf United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727, 735-37 (1980) (holding that a federal court could not suppress otherwise admis-
sible evidence that IRS agents obtained unlawfully, even if the evidence was brought
to them directly by a third person); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755 (1979)
(stating that exclusionary remedy is an extreme one appropriately used in limited cir-
cumstances); United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976).
316 Id
317 BuRNHAM, supra note 3, at 64-66.
2001] CIVIL TAX 1NQUIRIES AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 749
threaten the American voluntary reporting system. Moreover,
taxpayers frequently have little recourse against agent miscon-
duct.
Although agency abuse is a collective concern," 8 curtailing
IRS abuse should be of paramount importance because progres-
sive abuse threatens the substructure of the nation's voluntary
reporting system.1 9 Our nation's tax collection system centers
on the self-reporting and voluntary compliance of taxpayers.3"
If taxpayers are threatened by IRS abuse, however, they may not
cooperate.32' The whole system will collapse if taxpayers refuse
to submit to routine tax examinations. s ' Agents may be en-
couraged to violate the rules, and public confidence in the IRS
will decline.su2 While the IRS properly requests permission to
examine taxpayers' books and records in order to collect tax
revenue, use of such information to secure evidence for crimi-
nal prosecution poses a danger to the entire system.
What is worse, taxpayers frequently have little recourse
against agent misconduct. The legislature fails to specify a rem-
edy for taxpayers who have been injured by an IRS agents' fail-
ure to adhere to his or her regulations. The IRS has matured
into an enormously powerful instrument of social control in the
United States32'4 due in part to tacit congressional and judicial
3,8 United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 767 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(while self-scrutiny is a "lofty ideal," there is no reason why the IRS' disciplinary pro-
cedures should enjoy the Court's special confidence (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 42 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting))); Budner, supra note 3, at 801 (quoting
Address by Professor Benjamin Civiletti, The University of Texas School of Law) (Feb.
8, 1989) ("Former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, commenting on the inade-
quacies of relying on agency self-regulation, correctly observed that 'it is difficult to
punish your own family,' and that such internal regulations are 'insufficient to deter
[agent misconduct] in the passion of the hunt.'")).
'KosrELANETz, supra note 1, at 72.
See United States v. Flora, 362 U.S. 145 (1958) (stating that the American "sys-
tem of taxation is based on voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distrait");
KOsTELANET, supra note 1, at 72; TRAC, IRS at Work /RS Hstorj, atailable at
http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/aboutERS/irsHistotyhtlf (last visited Nov.
2, 2001) (noting that in 1999, the IRS Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti published a
plan called Modernizing America's Tax Agency, which called for a substantially in-
creased agency effort to improve voluntary compliance with the tax laws).
321 Id.
" SeeJames v. Illinois 493 U.S. 307, 317-19 (1990) (recognizing that police officers
will ignore rules that courts do not enforce).
... BuRNHAm, The Abuse of Power, N.Y. TiIES, Sept. 3, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 26,
cols. 1-2.
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policies not to interfere with the collection of taxes."5 Congress
has enacted only limited protections for tax defendants. Fur-
thermore, Congress has taken minor action to decrease agent
misconduct during the collection of evidence, providing only
spot enforcement of unlawful actions by IRS officials.2  Em-
pirical evidence indicates that the IRS has not reacted construc-
tively to these investigations.
Moreover, although Congress has traditionally permitted
taxpayers to recover damages from the IRS for certain Code vio-
lations,328 Congress has failed to specify any remedy for IRS vio-
lations of taxpayers' constitutional rights. 32 Through the
Taxpayers' Bill of Rights, Congress has enacted a collection of
provisions designed to increase taxpayers' awareness of their
rights during an IRS audit, and to enhance procedural safe-
guards available to taxpayers during an audit.3" The Act pro-
vides civil remedies to taxpayers that are hurt financially if an
IRS agent acts improperly, but the Act fails to specify any rem-
edy for violations of taxpayers' constitutional rights.331
'z Budner, supra note 3, at 790 (citing BURNHAM, supra note 3, at 21).
121 See BURNHAM, supra note 3, at 303 (noting that because of fear of retaliation by
IRS agents, members of Congress "have been discouraged from supporting legislative
efforts to improve the administration of tax laws...opposed by the IRS").
327 .
" "In the mid-1990s, the overall performance of the IRS-particularly the way it
dealt with individual taxpayers-..., became the subject of widespread public con-
cern." TRAC, IRS at Work: IRS History, available at http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/
findings/aboutIRS/irsHistory.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2001). The concern led to the
formation of a special commission, a series of oversight hearings by the Senate Fi-
nance Committee and the passage of corrective legislation. In 1988, Congress enacted
the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act. See Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of IRC (West Supp. 1989)). Included in the Act is a Taxpayer Bill
of Rights, a collection of provisions designed to clarify and strengthen the rights of
taxpayers, better inform them of their rights, and give them more ways to get relief
from IRS action.
329 Budner, supra note 3, at 790.
" H.R. 4163, 106th Cong. (2000) ("Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2000"); 146 CONG. REC.
H2057 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2000); see S. 1774, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC.
S13,891-99 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987); Creighton R. Meland, Jr., Omnibus Taxpayers'Bill
of Rights Act: Taxpayers'Remedy or Political Placebo ?, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 1787 (June 1988).
"' Budner, supra note 3, at 813; Meland, supra note 332, at 1814-18 (the Bill pro-
vides for "actual damages" for unreasonable IRS actions, but there is no plain mean-
ing of "actual damages" at common law or elsewhere.); see H.R. 4163, 106th Cong.
(2000) ("Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2000"); 146 CONG. REc. H2057 (daily ed. April 11,
2000); S. 1774, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S13,891-99 (daily ed. Oct. 8,
1987).
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Furthermore, judicial action insufficiently redresses these
wrongs. Courts defer tremendous judgments to individual
agents,"3 2 and generally do not enforce vulnerable taxpayers'
rights against the IRS. The IRS is the least judicially examined
law enforcement agency in the country, regularly intruding on
the lives of more Americans than any other federal agency. As
a result of its rampant abuses," self-regulation may be entirely
insufficient to prevent agent misconduct during the "passion of
the hunt. s3 The IRS rarely enforces its own rules,M  and pun-
ishment for agent misconduct is infrequent and lenient. 7 "The
IRS has no great incentive to scrutinize carefully the conduct of
interviews by its agents if the conduct does not affect the result
of the prosecution. Indeed, an agent's violation of these proce-
dures in selective cases may benefit the agency."3m Courts and
legislatures need to moderate IRS self-regulation in an attempt
to abate the abuse and safeguard taxpayers' constitutional
rights.
C. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Greater protections for taxpayers are imperative in light of
the high potential for IRS misconduct. Indeed, both policy and
legal rationales justify a more rigorous role of the legislature
and the courts. The attention of Congress and the Supreme
See United States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d 495, 498-499 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that
courts must give considerable weight to the IRS' own interpretation of their regula-
tions); United States v. Caldwell, 820 F.2d 1395, 1402 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting the re-
ferral decision is discretionary in nature and is not governed by any absolute
criterion); Groder v. United States, 816 F.2d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 1987) (second-
guessing a revenue agent's judgment should not become a routine chore for judges
(quoting United States v. Matis, 476 F. Supp. 1287, 1292-93 (S.D.N.Y.)))
BURNHA.N, TheAbuse of Power; N.Y. TIMES, Sept 3,1989, at 26.
'Id.
Budner, supra note 3, at 801.
See Caceres, 440 U.S. at 761 (MarshallJ., dissenting) (noting concern about the
IRS's failure to detect or disapprove of violations of its own internal rules); BUFNt.IM,
supra note 3, at 24 ("[T]he rapid turnover at the very top of the IRS, the recruitment
of most of its top administrators from within, and the almost complete lack of outside
review make the agency astonishingly consistent in the often erratic and hard-nosed
way that it deals with the American people.").
3- See Caceres, 440 U.S. at 767 n.9 (MarshallJ., dissenting) (citing evidence that no
dismissals or demotions had occurred following an internal audit, which had revealed
thirty-five to forty instances of improper monitoring as demonstrating why the Court
could not expect anything but de minimus sanctions from the inter-agency discipli-
nary process).
' United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1970).
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Court is imperative to mandate that Internal Revenue regula-
tions have the effect of law. Additionally, courts must enforce
IRS adherence to its own laws, and provide for a clearer indica-
tion of when the IRS violates its own rules. The following set of
proposals embody these ideals:
1. The Supreme Court must revisit the Caceres decision
Foremost, the Supreme Court must revisit the United States
v. Cacers3 9 decision, and declare that the IRM has the force and
effect of law where IRM provisions safeguard taxpayers' consti-
tutional rights. The Supreme Court must confront the tension
between the line of cases which hold that the IRM is merely a set
of operating procedures designed to govern the internal pro-
ceedings of the IRS,s40 and those cases which hold that the IRM
has the effect of law.s4' By addressing this issue, the Court will
allay much of the current debate over whether a taxpayer can
challenge the IRS based on noncompliance with its Manual.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[a] court's
duty to enforce an agency regulation is most evident when
compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution
or federal law."04' Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long
since held that a citizen under investigation is legally entitled to
insist upon the observance of rules promulgated by an executive
or legislative body.' Where an individual right is affected by
agency deviation from an established rule, the agency must fol-
low it even if it concerns only internal agency procedure. 3
Thus, using its own precedent as a guide, the Supreme Court
should find the IRM enforceable against the IRS, at the very
least, when its provisions pertain to a substantive right guaran-
teed by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court need not even overturn its decision in
Caceres to reach this conclusion. Caceres, read broadly, stands for
the proposition that every violation of the IRM is not tanta-
mount to a per se constitutional infringement on a taxpayer's
... 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
".. See cases cited supra note 119.
... See cases cited supra note 128.
Caceres, 440 U.S. at 749 (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152-53 (1945)).
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 US.
199, 235 (1974); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); Service v. Dulles, 354
U.S. 363 (1957); United States ex reL Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
'"Morton, 415 U.S. at 235.
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rights. Upon revisitation of this decision,' the Supreme Court
will recognize that while it did reject this per se rule, the Court
acknowledged the possibility that a federal court may enforce an
agency regulation when the Constitution or federal law man-. 346
dates compliance. The Court need only refine its prior lan-
guage.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court should confront the ten-
sion between the line of cases that hold that the IRM Section
4565.21 is merely an operating rule of the IRS, and those
cases, which hold that the IRM has the effect of Iaw.3 Because
significantly different rights, responsibilities and expectations
apply to civil audits compared to criminal tax investigations, it
would be unconstitutional if IRS agents could deliberately de-
ceive taxpayers into incriminating themselves during an audit
when activities of an obviously criminal nature are under inves-
tigation.' 9 IRM Section 4565.21 is designed to protect a taxpayer
from unreasonable search and seizure, self-incrimination, and
due process infringement. The Supreme Court should there-
fore rule that IRM Section 4565.21 protects a taxpayer's Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights, and confers substantive rights on
taxpayers.
2. Congress must augment Taxpayer Bill of Rights and codify pertinent
IRM provisions
Not only judicial action, but also congressional attention, is
imperative to declare that the IRM has the force and effect of
law. Congress must confer legal effect to pertinent provisions of
the IRM by codifying LRM provisions, which are mandated by
the Constitution or other federal law, and thereby grant sub-
stantive rights on taxpayers.
No statute currently addresses whether the IRM has the
force of law.30 The Taxpayers' Bill of Rights, which enhances
procedural safeguards available to taxpayers' by codifying cer-
tain provisions of both the IRM and Treasury Regulatons, "
3440 U.S. 741 (1979).
346 Id.
'7 Groder v. United States, 816 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1987).
McKee v. United States, 192 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 1999).
I&. (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 987 F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1993)).
3 See id
See id352 Meland, supra note 332, at 1800.
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currently lacks provisions necessary for full protection against
an IRS agent patently violating provisions of it Manual. 5 3 Fur-
thermore, the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights fails to specify any rem-
edy for violations of taxpayers' constitutional rights.!'
Codification of pertinent IRM provisions such as Section
4565.21 would therefore afford greater protection to taxpayers.
Because the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights already provides a
damages remedy for an IRS violation of a pertinent statute or
regulation, its protection will not extend to mere violations of
the IRM. s Codification of IRM Section 4565.21 would provide
taxpayers with a remedy against constitutional infringements by
IRS agents, and give legal effect to the safeguards presently em-
bodied in the Manual.56 In addition to protection against
agency caprice, codification eliminates the need for a taxpayer
to demonstrate detrimental reliance on the internal rule, man-
dated by some courts.5 Furthermore, codification of these pro-
visions affords greater protection to taxpayers without
significant changes to protections provided by current Manual
3518provisions.
113 See H.R. 4163, 106th Cong. (2000) ("Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2000); 146 CONG.
REC. H2057 (daily ed. April 11, 2000); see S. 1774, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG.
REC. S13, 891-99 (daily ed. Oct 8, 1987); Meland, supra note 332, at 1800; Budner,
supra note 3, at 813.
3" See Budner, supra note 3, at 813 (citing PRENTICE HALL INFORMATION SERVICES, A
COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE TECHNICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE AcT OF 1988, 901
at 233 (1988)); Meland, supra note 332, at 1814-18 (the Bill provides for "actual dam-
ages" for unreasonable IRS actions, but there is no plain meaning of "actual dam-
ages" at common law or elsewhere).
-" See H.R. 4163, 106th Cong. (2000) ("Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2000); 146 CONG.
REc. H2057 (daily ed. April 11, 2000).
" Meland, supra note 332, at 1800-01. The Administrative Procedure Act does not
give the force of law to the Manual. It is settled law that regulations promulgated
pursuant to notice and comment or on-the-record requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act have the force of law. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). It fol-
lows, therefore, that an agency action that violates agency rules cannot stand.
Meland, supra note 332, at 1800-01. The debate that has been seen thus far stems
from the fact that the IRM, as internal agency rules, has been allowed different treat-
ment from regulations and statutes. I&/ "[B)ecause Section 23 of the Bill provides a
damages remedy for an IRS violation of a pertinent statute or regulation, the bill's
protection has not extended to violations of the Internal Revenue Manual." Id.
.. Such a requirement does not exist with a statute, since its provisions apply re-
gardless of whether or not the taxpayer relied on them.
"" Meland, supra note 332, at 1800.
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3. Courts must revise constitutional tests used to determine violations of
IRM Section 4565.21
To alleviate the tremendous burden that taxpayers bear in
establishing that an IRS agent has violated Section 4565.21 of
the Manual, courts must revise the constitutional tests employed
to determine whether an IRM provision safeguards a taxpayer's
constitutional rights. Currently, the "affirmative misrepresenta-
ion" requirement, requiring a taxpayer to demonstrate an af-
firmative misrepresentation by the revenue agent that an
examination was a civil audit when it was in fact criminal, is too
narrow and grants individual revenue agents too much latitude
and discretion in making the criminal referral decision39
Courts rarely find an affirmative misrepresentation on the part
of the IRS agent.30 The requirement thus places the taxpayer at
a tremendous disadvantage, while favoring the IRS.115 Courts
need to broaden this test to one that incorporates a "totality of
the circumstances" standard.
The "totality of the circumstances" test would consider more
factors than merely the actions of the IRS agent. It would take
into account the entire set of circumstances from the perspec-
tive of the taxpayer,m such as the taxpayer's education, experi-
ence and intelligence, and whether it was reasonable for the
taxpayer to believe that the case was civil when it was in fact
criminal, based on the agent's representations. Courts would
find that an IRS agent misrepresented the criminal nature of
the audit based on these individual circumstances of the tax-
payer. This test would ease the burden that a taxpayer bears in
showing that an agent has violated the provisions of the Manual,
and would introduce a notion of overall fairness to the constitu-
tional tests.
See discussion supra Sections W.B.I., IV.B.2.
See discussion supra Sections V.B. 1., 1V.B.2.
s' Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cemt. denied
400 U.S. 831; United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400
U.S. 943.
m United States v. Adams, 214 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2000); Stores v. Hardees Food
Systems, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6307, Nos. 98-3285, 98-3320 (April 6, 2000) (whether
a risk of peril above and beyond the ordinary is reasonably foreseeable is determined
based on the totality of the circumstances); United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682
(7th Cir. 1999).
"s Manillas, 183 F.3d 682 (using "totality of the circumstances" because the judi-
cial process does not deal with hard certainties but with probabilities).
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Additionally, courts must afford less deference to the indi-
vidual revenue agents. Limiting enforcement of regulations to
instances of bad faith invites law enforcement officials to ignore
constitutional principles and gamble for a lenient application of
the rules. Therefore, courts must not espouse cursory warnings
encouraging revenue agents to err on the side of protecting
taxpayers' constitutional rights, but must reign in agents when
they have lulled taxpayers into compromising their constitu-
tional rights.
4. Courts should require revenue agents to warn taxpayers of their
constitutional rights
Courts should also require that IRS agents warn taxpayers of
their constitutional rights. At the onset of a tax investigation, a
revenue agent should disclose to the taxpayer that the civil in-
vestigation may result in criminal charges. The agent should
also notify the taxpayer when the focus of the investigation has
changed in status from civil to criminal. Although not constitu-
tionally required,3  these warnings would instruct taxpayers
about their constitutional rights, should they relinquish evi-
dence to the revenue agent for inspection.
Currently, a revenue agent, unlike a special agent,"' need
not disclose to the taxpayer, at the onset of the investigation,
that the investigation may result in criminal charges5 ts Revenue
agents also do not have a duty to apprise a taxpayer that the
taxpayer need not furnish requested information, and that if
the taxpayer does furnish such information, it may be used- 67
against him in a criminal proceeding. Furthermore, the reve-
nue agent also has no duty to disclose to the taxpayer when the
3', Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 444 (1966) (explaining that warnings of tax-
payers' constitutional rights are required only when suspect is subjected to custodial
interrogation).
'5 United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1977).
See discussion supra Section I.B.3.; see, e.g., Kaatz, 705 F.2d at 1243; Tweel, 550
F.2d at 298 (holding that mere failure of a revenue agent "to warn the taxpayer that
the investigation may result in criminal charges, absent any acts by the agent which
materially misrepresent the nature of the inquiry, do[es] not constitute fraud, deceit
or trickery"); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400
U.S. 831; United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1964) (revenue agents do
not have a duty to apprise a taxpayer that he need not furnish requested informa-
tion); Greene v. United States, 296 F.2d 841, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1961) (revenue agents
do not have a duty to apprise a taxpayer that if he does furnish requested informa-
tion, such information may be used against him in criminal proceedings).
.. United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1964).
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focus of the investigation has changed in status from civil to
criminal.3 Thus, taxpayers may not know that information
turned over during the course of a civil audit may be used
against them in a civil proceeding.m
Several commentators and a few courts have argued that
"the thrust of the Supreme Court's opinion in Miranda v. Ari-
zona ... requires that all taxpayers interviewed by IRS [a]gents
be warned of the potential criminal implications of a tax investi-
gation. "370 The benefits of these Miranda-like warnings would be
numerous, while the cost would be minimal. Clarifying the
rights to taxpayers would prevent litigation resulting from tax-
payers claiming that they are unaware of their rights, and that
the IRS agents should have provided some sort of warning. Fur-
thermore, this added warning would be easy to implement. Fi-
nally, these warnings would provide additional protection of
taxpayers' constitutional rights. A taxpayer's ignorance or fail-
ure to know his or her constitutional rights should not remove
these constitutional protections.
5. IRS must strengthen enforcement of its own rules
Finally, attention of the IRS is necessary to restrict future
agent misconduct, and to penalize those agents who violate
their rules. The IRS has matured into the leastjudicially exam-
ined law enforcement agency in the countyY' The effectiveness
of the regulations promulgated by the IRS depends in large part
on the good faith and judgment of its agents in conducting
their investigations. IRS regulations such as IRM Section
4565.21 require the revenue agent to exercise extraordinary
delicate judgment as to when a civil investigation should be dis-
continued, and referred to the CID for criminal prosecution.
' See cases cited supra note 271.
' SALTZMAN, supra note 8, 1 2.03[2] [b]; se United States v. Meier, 607 F.2d 215
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980); United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d
941 (7th Cir. 1964).
S"0 United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir. 1970) (citing United States v.
Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969)); United States v. Turnzynski, 268 F. Supp.
847 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant
View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YAE LJ. 1 (1966); Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the
Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigations Under Escobedo and Miranda: The "Critical Stage," 53
IowAL. REv. 1074 (1968)).
" BURNHAm, The Abuse of Power, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 3, 1989, at 26.
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But the rules do not protect taxpayers from overzealous IRS
agents in the "passion of the hunt".
72
The IRS needs to spend the additional time and resources
necessary to adequately inform its agents of the scope and in-
tent of these rules. Indeed, the IRS must encourage its revenue
agents to "err on the side of protecting taxpayers' constitutional
rights when they conduct their investigation."373 As an agency
that has been largely left unexamined by legislative agencies,
the IRS needs to strengthen its own internal self-regulation if it
wishes to maintain its history of voluntary compliance, and the
confidence of its taxpayers.
Moreover, the IRS needs to enforce penalties on agents who
ignore their rules and jeopardize the constitutional rights of tax-
paying citizens. Limiting enforcement of regulations to in-
stances of bad faith invites law enforcement officials to ignore
constitutional principles and gamble for a lenient application of
the rules.374 The IRS must therefore rein in its agents when
they have effectively used the effect of a "civil audit" to lull tax-
payers into compromising their constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
The silent transition from a civil audit to a criminal investi-
gation should concern taxpayers and courts alike. Presently,
however, taxpayers seem to be the only ones disturbed. Courts
have generally failed to enforce taxpayers' rights, deferring in-
stead to the individual discretion of IRS agents.37 While most
courts have recognized the problems inherent in affording too
much deference to the IRS, they have generally neglected to
curtail the IRS's power.3 16 As a result, IRS agents have been
known to violate provisions of their own Manual 7
While efforts to bring tax-avoiding citizens to punishment
are praiseworthy, IRS agents cannot aid this effort by sacrificing
'7 Budner, supra note 3, at 801.
371 United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
374 United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 766 (1979) (Marshall,J, dissenting).
-'7 See United States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d 495, 498-99 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that
courts must give considerable weight to the IRS' own interpretation of their regula-
tions); Groder v. United States, 816 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that second-
guessing a revenue agent's judgment should not become a routine chore forjudges).
-71 See McKee, 192 F.3d 535; United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999).
7 Caceres, 440 U.S. at 761 (Marshall,J, dissenting).
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taxpayers' fundamental rights. Therefore, judicial and congres-
sional intervention is necessary to provide a clearer indication of
when the IRS violates its own rules, and to enforce adherence to
its own laws. If courts and Congress remain idle, taxpayers and
their attorneys, who follow proper procedures, may find them-
selves ambushed.
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